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ABSTRACT
In recent years, state legislatures have passed a record number of abortion restrictions, many of
which regulate the dialogue between doctor and patient before a woman can access abortion. As
increasingly aggressive doctor-patient regulations are challenged, the courts are struggling to
determine what constraints, if any, Casey placed on the state’s ability to regulate abortion in the
interest of protecting potential life, short of outright abortion bans. This Article revisits the
compromise struck in Casey, tracing its attempt to accommodate two constitutional goals in
tension—the state’s interest in protecting potential life and the woman’s liberty interest in
autonomously determining her reproductive future—through the undue burden framework. The
Article argues that the truthful and nonmisleading standard for informed consent regulations in
Casey is pivotal to implementing the balance the Court sought to strike. It seeks to uncover the
standard’s roots in prior informed consent case law in order to provide a context for lower courts
implementing the standard. It demonstrates that the nonmisleading standard, at least in part,
arises from the Court’s opinion in Akron.
This analysis is particularly important given the trajectory of state regulation of the doctor-patient
dialogue. In Akron, the Court struck down a regulation where the state required the doctor to
impart a number of disclosures that raised an inference that the state was seeking to mislead a
woman’s decision-making. In Thornburgh, the Court struck down an informed consent law that
sought to persuade women to continue their pregnancy but through nonmisleading means. In
Casey, the Court reversed course and approved of regulations similar to those in Thornburgh
but imposed a nonmisleading constraint on such regulation. Twenty years later, doctor-patient
regulation more closely resembles the disclosures challenged in Akron than Thornburgh and
Casey. Therefore, a close analysis of the nonmisleading standard from Akron to Casey can aid
courts in implementing the standard to maintain the balance of constitutional interests that
Casey sought to strike.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, state legislatures have passed a record number of
abortion restrictions. Many of these restrictions focus on crafting and
regulating the content of the dialogue between doctor and patient
before a woman can access an abortion. As increasingly aggressive
doctor-patient regulations are challenged, the courts are struggling to
determine what constraints, if any, the Supreme Court’s decision in
1
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey placed on the
states’ ability to regulate abortion in the interest of protecting potential life, short of outright abortion bans. This Article contributes to
the scholarly dialogue regarding where courts should draw the constitutional line on abortion regulation under Casey by analyzing Casey’s
“truthful and nonmisleading” standard for regulations concerning
2
doctor-patient dialogue. It revisits the compromise struck in Casey,
tracing its attempt to accommodate two constitutional goals in tension—the state’s interest in protecting potential life and the woman’s
liberty interest in autonomously determining her reproductive future—through the undue burden framework. The Article argues that
the truthful and nonmisleading standard for doctor-patient dialogue
regulation in Casey, particularly the nonmisleading component, is
pivotal to implementing the balance the Court sought to strike by
protecting a woman’s ultimate autonomy in making the decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Nonmisleading in this context must mean something beyond
technical truthfulness. This Article demonstrates that it does; it re1
2

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 882.
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flects the autonomy-protecting principle within Casey. The Article
uncovers the nonmisleading standard’s roots in prior informed consent case law in order to provide a context for lower courts implementing the standard. It demonstrates that the nonmisleading
standard, at least in part, arises from the Court’s opinion in City of Ak3
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.. This analysis is particularly important given the trajectory of state regulation of the doctorpatient dialogue. In Akron, the Court struck down a regulation which
required the doctor to recite disclosures that raised an inference that
4
the state was seeking to mislead a woman’s decision-making. In
5
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the
Court struck down an informed consent law that sought to persuade
a woman to continue her pregnancy, but through nonmisleading
means. In Casey, the Court reversed course and approved of regulations similar to those in Thornburgh but at the same time imposed a
6
nonmisleading constraint on such regulation.
Twenty years later, doctor-patient regulations more closely resemble the disclosures challenged in Akron than in Thornburgh and Casey.
The new generation of doctor-patient dialogue regulation departs
too far from traditional informed consent principles to be properly
so-termed. Instead, this Article will refer to the new generation of
these regulations as “dissuasion laws” because the laws seek to dissuade women from having abortions by means that do not align with
the principle of autonomy inherent in the informed consent model.
However, as of yet, lower courts—focusing on the state deference aspect of the Casey balance—have failed to give force to the nonmisleading component of the truthful and nonmisleading standard.
These courts have problematically used optional doctor commentary
to “assuage” constitutional concerns, required doctors to give convoluted explanations to cure facially false disclosures without consideration of the misleading results, and reduced the truthful and nonmisleading requirement to technical truthfulness only. Given that the
new generation of dissuasion laws closely tracks the statute struck
down as misleading in Akron, a close analysis of the nonmisleading
standard from Akron to Casey can aid courts in implementing the
standard to maintain the balance of constitutional interests that Casey
sought to strike.

3
4
5
6

462 U.S. 416 (1983).
Id. at 451–52.
476 U.S. 747 (1986).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the Casey decision, the compromise embedded in it, and the truthful and nonmisleading standard within this framework. Part II discusses two main
strategies of the antiabortion movement in the years after Casey: incrementalism and the women-protective antiabortion argument. It
conducts an inventory of the new generation of compulsory dissuasion laws from ideological disclosures to ultrasound laws. Part III reviews the post-Casey federal law addressing doctor-patient dialogue
regulation and implementing the nonmisleading standard. Until recently, courts have been deferential to states in recognition of Casey’s
permissive stance towards abortion regulation, but inattentive to the
constraints Casey placed on such regulation. Therefore, the doctrine
currently lacks a robust conception of what misleading means in the
Casey context.
Part IV turns to the nonmisleading standard. It draws on Akron
and Thornburgh to trace a doctrinal and stare decisis argument for a
more robust conception of the nonmisleading standard that can implement the autonomy-protecting aspect of the Casey compromise. It
argues that the nonmisleading standard can serve important constitutional goals—protecting autonomy, smoking out unconstitutional
purposes, and striking down women-protective statutes that are based
on gender stereotypes and violate equality norms—while still preserving significant space for state regulation. Finally, it applies the nonmisleading standard to three pieces of compulsory dissuasion legislation, demonstrating the standard’s importance, but also its
limitations as only part of the larger undue burden framework: (1)
the “whole, separate, unique, living human being” disclosure; (2) the
2011 South Dakota law, requiring overwhelming disclosures and a visit to a “crisis pregnancy center”; and (3) the mandatory ultrasound
with mandatory description law. Given the constitutional values it
serves and its doctrinal support, I argue that the nonmisleading
standard is a fruitful place for courts to start recalibrating the enforcement of Casey to more accurately preserve the balance Casey
sought to strike.
In recent years, a number of scholars
have commented on the various ways in which the lower courts have
eroded the autonomy-protecting aspects of Casey. Linda Wharton,
Susan Frietsche, and Kathryn Kolbert have comprehensively documented the lower courts’ imposition of nearly impossible evidentiary
requirements for proving an undue burden where regulations increase the cost and accessibility of abortion services as well as their re-
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jection of nearly all claims based on improper purpose. Priscilla
Smith has noted the lower courts’ failure to attend to the legitimacy
8
of state interests in abortion regulation. Caitlin Borgmann has argued that the undue burden standard’s lax application has under9
mined key rights of privacy inherent in the right to choose.
Concerns about the underenforcement of Casey’s autonomypreserving principle have also generated significant scholarly work on
how to revive the undue burden standard’s force. Smith has argued
that litigators should introduce traditional sex equality arguments in
10
challenges to abortion regulation. Khiara Bridges has argued that
the lower courts must “unburden” the undue burden standard of its
acceptance of the moral significance of the fetus, which she argues
overdetermines every undue burden evaluation, and apply a morally
11
agnostic undue burden standard. Less optimistic scholars have proposed a look to the state constitutions and courts for constitutional
12
protections no longer enforced in federal courts.
This Article contributes to this literature by suggesting analytical
tools for applying the nonmisleading standard to more faithfully enforce the compromise struck in Casey. This Article is the first to closely analyze the truthful and nonmisleading principle within the overarching framework of the undue burden standard and its guiding
purpose: protecting women’s autonomy while respecting the state’s
interest in regulating to promote childbirth over abortion. It is also
the first to systematically track how the lower courts have applied this
standard as challenges to dissuasion laws mount. Most importantly,
this Article contributes to the dialogue around the constitutionality of
dissuasion laws—a major component of contemporary abortion litigation—by focusing on the history of the nonmisleading standard. It
7
8

9
10
11
12

Linda J. Wharton, Susan Frietsche & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections
on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 353 (2006).
Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants: Using Sex Equality Arguments to Demand Examination of the Legitimacy of State Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 377, 389 (2011).
Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of Women’s
Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 291, 324 (2010).
Smith, supra note 8, at 378.
Khiara M. Bridges, Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915, 916 (2010).
See Scott A. Moss & Douglas M. Raines, The Intriguing Federalist Future of Reproductive Rights,
88 B.U. L. REV. 175, 177 (2008) (noting that state constitutions may provide abortion
right protections as the “federal right declines”); Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and
Beyond: Enhancing Protection for Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 469, 469–70 (2009) (concluding that “state constitutions are playing an important role in safeguarding abortion rights in individual states in an era of diminished
federal constitutional protection . . . at the federal level”).
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uncovers a history of the nonmisleading requirement from Akron to
Thornburgh to Casey that gives content to its purpose and meaning by
connecting it to the overarching purposes of the Casey compromise,
confirms its centrality to the Casey balance, and enhances its legitimacy in constitutional jurisprudence. In fact, the importance of barring
misleading regulation was supported by Justice Byron White, an original Roe dissenter. Scholars have previously discarded all of Akron and
Thornburgh as relics of pre-Casey jurisprudence. This Article challenges that assumption; a close reading of these cases suggests that parts
of Akron should still inform the courts’ thinking about what is misleading after Casey. In fact, Casey standardized the concerns about
misleading regulation that were first articulated in Akron. The truthful and nonmisleading standard is only a component of the undue
burden framework. However, it is a central one that is growing in importance as dissuasion laws mount and become increasingly aggressive. This Article provides the first systematic account of its history,
an analysis of its implementation, and a path forward.
I. DECIPHERING THE CONTOURS OF THE CASEY COMPROMISE
A. Tension in the Undue Burden Standard: Respecting the State’s Interest in
Potential Life and Preserving Women’s Autonomy
13

Twenty years ago, Planned Parenthood v. Casey worked a radical
change in the constitutional law of abortion. This section traces the
goals of Casey and the contours of the Casey doctrine in implementing
those goals. In doing so, it seeks to discover the tools that are available in the doctrine for determining what types of state regulation of
abortion the decision opened the door for and what limits it placed
on that regulation.
1. A New Direction in Abortion Jurisprudence: The Trimester Framework
to the Undue Burden Standard
14

In Roe v. Wade, about twenty years prior to Casey, the Court recognized a constitutional right to privacy that encompassed the abor15
tion decision. To effectuate the right, the Court constructed the

13
14
15

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113, (1973).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Roe decision built on the prior right to privacy cases protecting
the use of contraception, first for married couples, then for all individuals. Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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16

well-known trimester framework.
During the first trimester, the
state could not regulate access to abortion because it lacked a compelling interest in either the health of the mother or the potential life
17
of the fetus. During the second trimester, the state could regulate
18
the abortion procedure in the interest of the health of the mother.
Only after viability (roughly coinciding with the third trimester of
pregnancy) did the state have a compelling interest in the potential
life of the fetus, thus allowing it to regulate and/or proscribe abortion, “except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of the life
19
or health of the mother.” From 1973 to 1992, the constitutional law
20
Over
on state regulation of abortion remained relatively stable.
those years, the Court struck down numerous abortion regulations,
21
including bans on particular procedures, hospitalization require22
ments, and informed consent laws designed to influence a woman’s
23
decision. In 1989, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Court
indicated that it might reconsider its position on the abortion right
and showed willingness to apply a significantly lower standard in

16
17
18
19
20

21
22

23

Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 164–65.
This is not to say that there was no significant development in this area of the law or with
regard to limitations placed upon the principles of Roe, only that the basic Roe framework
remained intact. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (upholding the
ban on the use of federal Medicaid funds for most abortions); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 643–44 (1979) (holding that states can impose parental consent provisions for minors as long as those states provide adequate judicial bypass mechanisms).
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67–71 (1976) (concluding that a state law requiring spousal consent for an abortion is unconstitutional).
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (striking
down “Akron’s requirement that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital”); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 478, 482 (1983)
(holding that the Missouri statute “requir[ing] that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy
be performed in a hospital” is unconstitutional).
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760 (1986)
(holding that a state statute mandating that a doctor provide specific disclosures to a
pregnant woman is unconstitutional); Akron, 462 U.S. at 442–49 (holding the same in an
earlier case). However, as this Article discusses in length, the required disclosures in Akron and Thornburgh were different in both kind and scope.

May 2014]

TRUTHFUL BUT MISLEADING?

1361

24

evaluating abortion regulations. Nonetheless, it refrained from ad25
dressing the core holdings of Roe or its implementation framework.
Casey was a challenge to Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act. In
1988 and 1989, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the law to include new informed consent disclosures, a twenty-four-hour waiting
period, a parental consent provision, a spousal notification require26
ment, and various other reporting requirements for clinics. The law
included numerous provisions similar to those struck down by recent
27
28
prior Supreme Court cases such as Akron and Thornburgh —
including provisions drawn directly from its predecessor law, invali29
dated in Thornburgh in 1986 —and thus presented a straightforward
vehicle to challenge Roe.
The Casey Court did not entirely overturn Roe, as many expected.
However, the Casey plurality—composed of Justices Sandra Day
O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter—did upend Roe’s
clean rules on abortion regulation and reflected the tensions within
the national debate. It eliminated the trimester framework, upheld
the state’s right to significantly regulate abortion throughout pregnancy, and reworked the constitutional underpinnings of a woman’s
ultimate right to make the decision to terminate her pregnancy. The
Court introduced the undue burden framework, opening the door to
24

25

26
27
28
29

492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (“Stare decisis . . . has less power in constitutional cases, where,
save for constitutional amendments, this Court is the only body able to make needed
changes. . . . We have not refrained from reconsideration of a prior construction of the
Constitution that has proved ‘unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.’ . . . We
think the Roe trimester framework falls into that category.” (internal citations omitted)).
Id. at 521. (“This case . . . affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe . . . .”). Even
though this case elided the Roe question, the possibility of Roe’s demise was widely speculated. Due to recent changes in the composition of the Court, only two known supporters of the Roe decision remained on the bench: Justice Harry Blackmun and Justice John
Paul Stevens. The other Justices were either known opponents or recent Republican
nominees presumed to oppose Roe. Linda Greenhouse, Both Sides in Abortion Argument
Look Past Court to Political Battle, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at A1. Even pro-choice groups
seemed resigned to the belief that the Court was poised to overturn Roe. Nonetheless,
pro-choice advocates chose to challenge a Pennsylvania abortion regulation, seeking a reaffirmation of Roe in the Supreme Court against the odds: “The litigation strategy is,” explained the president of the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, “[i]f indeed we don’t have
Roe, American women ought to know about it and the Court shouldn’t be duplicitous.”
Ruth Marcus, Abortion-Rights Groups Expect to Lose, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1992, at A1. She
continued, “I don’t think we have anything to lose.” Id. It was in this setting that the Casey challenge arrived in the Court in 1992.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3205–06, 3209, 3214 (1990).
462 U.S. 416, 422–24, 448 (1983).
476 U.S. 747, 750, 764 (1986).
Compare Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759–71 (describing the provisions challenged in Thornbugh) with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879–
901 (1992) (analyzing the various provisions challenged in Casey).
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significant state regulation of abortion, but placing constitutional limits on the state to respect women’s autonomy in the ultimate decisionmaking.
The Court found that Roe’s “rigid prohibition” on nearly all regulation in the first trimester of pregnancy “undervalue[d] the State’s
30
interest in potential life.” Thus, recognition and respect for the
state’s interest in legislating to protect potential life was central to the
Casey decision and its holdings. But at the same time, the Court upheld the “essential holding” of Roe: the right of a woman, before viability, to choose to have an abortion and obtain it “without undue in31
terference from the State.” It reaffirmed the root principle that a
woman should have the autonomy to decide whether or not to continue her pregnancy and that state action must be limited to ensure
32
that the right exists not only in theory, but also in fact. Nonetheless,
in recognition of countervailing state interests, how and to what extent state action must be limited changed. Under Casey, the state only violates the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause when it
unduly burdens a woman’s ability to decide to terminate her pregnancy, irrespective of when during pregnancy the regulation oper33
ates. The Court defined an undue burden as any regulation that
has the “purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
34
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”
The breadth of the change in the standard is demonstrated by the
Court’s holdings. Whereas only six years earlier, the Court had
struck down nearly all of the provisions of a practically identical statute, the Court now upheld all the regulations except one. The informed consent provisions, including disclosures about gestational
age and development, the waiting period, and the reporting re35
quirements all passed constitutional muster under the new standard.
However, the Court held that the spousal notification requirement,
which required all married women to inform their spouses of their
intents before they could access abortion services, presented an un36
due burden and therefore failed even under the lower bar of Casey.
Sensitive to the realities of spousal abuse in some marriages, the
Court concluded that the notification requirements would represent

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 898.
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a “substantial obstacle” for women in these relationships. In cases of
domestic abuse, the law would essentially result in the state granting a
husband an “effective veto over his wife’s decision” in violation of the
38
core liberty that both Roe and Casey aimed to protect. In the wake of
Casey, it was clear that there had been a sea change in the constitutional jurisprudence of abortion. However, the contours of the
change were less clear. The Court replaced a bright line rule barring
state interference with a fundamental right with a standard meant to
vindicate conflicting constitutional interests and principles. Outside
of the particular provisions upheld or struck down in Casey, the constitutionality of various possible abortion regulations became an open
question.
2. Goals in Tension: Respecting the State Interest in Potential Life and
Women’s Autonomy
The Casey decision has been widely described, both positively and
negatively, as the Court’s attempt at a compromise in the abortion
debate. Professor Neal Devins describes the Casey decision as a “splitthe-difference” approach, which, he argues, largely “settled the abor39
tion wars.” However, the description of Casey as nothing more than
a political choice to “split-the-difference” and broker a compromise
on abortion, while convincing, does not sufficiently engage with the
internal dialogue of Casey. The puzzle of Casey is that it attempted to
vindicate both the state’s interest in protecting potential life and the
woman’s liberty interest in autonomous control over her reproductive life. This Subpart analyzes how the Court’s opinion demonstrates
deep engagement with this set of conflicting constitutional values and
how the Court sought to use the undue burden standard to set the
constitutional balance. The Court’s opinion reflected an understanding of the rights in conflict at issue in the case before them, unlike
the Roe decision, which no longer reflected the values embedded in
the debate over a woman’s right to choose. As scholars Reva Siegel
and Robert Post argue, the Court in Casey seriously engaged with “the
ideals of both proponents and opponents of abortion” and thus “ac40
cord[ed] great respect to both sides of the abortion controversy.”

37
38
39
40

Id. at 893–94.
Id. at 897.
Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 118
YALE L.J. 1318, 1322 (2009).
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 428–29 (2007).
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The Court’s reflection of the ongoing constitutional clash in our society over abortion, they argue, epitomizes their theory of “democratic constitutionalism,” wherein constitutional law repeatedly interacts
41
with the polity in shaping rights and constitutional structure.
The Casey Court gave far greater weight than Roe to the views expressed by abortion opponents and the states that seek to regulate
(or eliminate) abortion to vindicate the rights of the unborn. In Roe,
the Court simply concluded that Texas, “by adopting one theory of
life,” could not override the rights of pregnant women (an opinion
shared by the Casey Court) without seriously appraising the state’s
42
concerns. While the Court cursorily recognized the state’s interest
43
in “protecting the potentiality of human life,” it did not consider it a
44
valid purpose for any regulation whatsoever until viability.
Thus, the sea change in Casey primarily came from the Court’s reversal on how much weight the state is allowed to assign to the fetus
in the regulation of abortion. In Roe, the Court focused on the im45
pact of the abortion right on medical providers and their patients.
But Casey recognized the broader ramifications of the abortion right
in a society torn about its moral implications:
It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who
must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society
which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent
human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life
46
that is aborted.

The Court recognized the “substantial” and “profound” state interest
47
in protecting potential life. Indeed, the plurality opinion stressed
the weightiness of this interest even as measured against the woman’s
liberty and equality rights, deferring the question of how the Justices
would have resolved the question of these conflicting interests in the
first instance:

41
42
43
44

45

46
47

Id. at 376.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 163; see also Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise—Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REV. 921, 929 (1992) (characterizing the Roe Court’s treatment of the state interest in
potential life as “lip service”).
See, e.g., Betty Friedan, Abortion: A Woman’s Civil Right, in LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B.
SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT’S RULING 255 (2010) (“[T]he Court figured the doctor as the agent responsible for abortion decisions and the criteria guiding those decisions as medical.”).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
Id. at 878.
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The weight to be given this state interest . . . was the difficult question
faced in Roe. We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been
Members of the Court when the valuation of the state interest came before it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court
48
did . . . .

Eschewing the original question, the Court held that it would be inappropriate twenty years later to overturn Roe in its entirety. However, it also determined that the Roe trimester framework failed to
properly value the state’s interest and held that regulations that “express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted”
throughout pregnancy, as long as they do not impose an undue bur49
den on the woman’s ultimate decision.
Even as it cut back significantly on the absolute protections of a
woman’s right to abortion, the Casey Court also engaged more directly with the woman’s position in the abortion decision than the Roe
Court. The Roe decision paid little heed to the women’s rights argu50
ments articulated before it and that, at that time, were just begin51
ning to animate the public debate. Instead, the Court focused pri52
marily on doctors and the patient-doctor relationship:
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical
treatment according to his professional judgment . . . . [T]he abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision,
53
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.

Roe’s lack of attention to women and the equality arguments at the
heart of the abortion issue is a main source of liberal critiques of the
decision. Perhaps most famously, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (then
a judge on the D.C. Circuit) wrote:
[I]n the balance is a woman’s autonomous charge of her full life’s
course—as Professor Karst put it, her ability to stand in relation to man,
society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen. . . . Overall, the Court’s Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the

48
49
50

51

52
53

Id. at 871.
Id. at 875–78.
See Motion for Permission to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women
Lawyers, et al. at 6–7 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40), 1971 WL
134283, at *6–7 (summarizing several reasons why the Georgia and Texas statutes at issue
violated various women’s rights).
See, e.g., Friedan, supra note 45, at 8; see also id. at 256 (noting that while Roe’s holding
“decriminalized abortion along the lines that the feminists and others advocated,” its reasoning “gave only blurry and indistinct expression to the values feminists argued were at
stake in protecting women’s choices”).
Id. at 255 (“[T]he Court figured the doctor as the agent responsible for abortion decisions and the criteria guiding those decisions as medical.”).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 165–66.
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opinion’s concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the
54
exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective.

Casey’s discussion of the abortion right recognized in Roe focused
more specifically on the woman in the decision, recognizing the various intertwined liberty and equality rights at stake for her in the right
to her reproductive freedom. In explaining why the state cannot
mandate that a woman continue her pregnancy against her wishes,
the Court explained: “[A woman’s] suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the
55
woman’s role . . . .” The Court’s analysis of the spousal notification
provision further recognized the intersection between a woman’s liberty interest in the decision and her right to equal respect. The
Court held that the spousal notification law reflected antiquated
views of the family and women’s role in marriage that the state is no
longer constitutionally permitted to enforce:
[The spousal notification requirement] embodies a view of marriage
consonant with the common-law status of married women but repugnant
to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights
secured by the Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally
56
protected liberty when they marry.

These passages not only recognize the important liberty interest in
the abortion decision—a woman’s “destiny . . . must be shaped to a
57
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives” —
but also tie the right to the sex equality argument that reproductive
rights accord women equal respect and dignity by not allowing the
state to enforce “its own vision of the woman’s role,” motherhood,
58
upon her.
Casey also acknowledged the practical intersection between women’s liberty to control whether and when to have children and women’s ability to achieve equality in society more generally. The Court
54

55
56
57
58

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,
63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383, 386 (1985); see also WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID (J.M.
Balkin ed., 2005)(compiling liberal critiques of Roe from prominent constitutional scholars).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
Id. at 898.
Id. at 852.
Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 816 (2007); see, e.g., id. at 819 (“Control
over whether and when to give birth is also of crucial dignitary importance to women.
Vesting women with control over whether and when to give birth breaks with the customary assumption that women exist to care for others. It recognizes women as selfgoverning agents who are competent to make decisions for themselves . . . . In a symbolic
as well as a practical sense, then, reproductive rights repudiate customary assumptions
about women’s agency and women’s roles.”).
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considered how women’s equality gains in the past twenty years built
upon the Court’s recognition of the abortion right: “The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproduc59
tive lives.” This recognition from the Court reflects the argument,
developed by women’s rights advocates and scholars, that without
control over their reproductive lives, women cannot reach any level
of practical equality in our society. This view recognizes the immense
effects of pregnancy on a woman’s life, from her health to her earn60
ing potential and economic security to her control over her intimate
relationships. As a member of the Society for Human Abortions, an
early feminist abortion rights organization, put it,
[W]e can get all the rights in the world . . . and none of them means a
doggone thing if we . . . can’t control what happens to us, if the whole
course of our lives can be changed by somebody else that can get us
61
pregnant by accident, or by deceit, or by force.

This is particularly true in a world where institutions are still “organized on the basis of traditional sex-role assumptions that this society
no longer believes fair to enforce, yet is unwilling institutionally to
62
redress.”
In sum, the Court’s analysis recognized the intersection of women’s equality and liberty rights imbedded in the right to abortion in a
manner that prior constitutional jurisprudence had not. It is perhaps
unsurprising that Casey spoke in a constitutional register more focused on women’s rights than Roe. Indeed, it would have been near
impossible for the Court at the time of Roe to speak such strong sex
equality talk; the very first sex equality case was decided only the year
63
before. Even if the right was diluted after Casey, the stated constitutional underpinnings of the abortion right now more closely align
with the societal significance of the abortion right for women.

59
60

61

62
63

Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
See, e.g., Deborah J. Anderson, Melissa Binder & Kate Krause, The Motherhood Wage Penalty
Revisited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 273, 273 (2003) (“It is well documented that mothers earn less than women
without children.”); Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood,
66 AM. SOC. REV. 204, 205, 219 (2001) (reviewing numerous studies finding a wage penalty for motherhood and finding a seven percent wage penalty for motherhood per child
among young American women).
KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 97 (1984); see also FLORA
DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1960, at 166
(1991) (referencing Kristin Luker’s statement).
Siegel, supra note 58, at 819.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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B. The Compromise Illustrated: The Undue Burden Standard and the
Truthful and Not Misleading Standard
1. The Content of the Undue Burden Standard
Having established that the Casey court sought to respect both the
state’s interest in protecting potential life and a woman’s liberty right
in controlling her reproductive life, the remaining question is where
the Court drew the line in effectuating the compromise between these two seemingly irreconcilable values. The undue burden standard
has an inherent tension built within it. What tools did it provide
courts for negotiating this tension in evaluating abortion regulations?
Professor Neal Devins suggests that the undue burden standard is
essentially lacking in any substantive content to guide courts in negotiating the interests in conflict in abortion cases: “Casey is a sufficiently malleable standard that it can be applied to either uphold or inval64
idate nearly any law that a state is likely to pass.” He labels it a
65
“[s]uper-[p]recedent,” but its stable status, according to Devins, relies upon its hollowness: If Justices disagree with Casey, rather than
overruling it, they will “manipulate the Casey precedent to support fa66
vored policy positions.” If Devins’ description is correct, then Casey
effaces any prior content of the constitutional law on abortion, leaving nothing but opaque space where states can legislate on abortion
aggressively, but at the risk of the preferences of the judges that will
adjudicate challenges.
Meanwhile, numerous scholars and women’s rights advocates have
argued that the undue burden standard does not, in reality, protect
both sets of constitutional values, but rather sacrifices the ultimate
decision-making autonomy of the woman to the state’s interest in
regulation to protect the unborn. National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL) President Kate Michaelman
67
called it a “smoke screen . . . devastating for women.”
Professor
Caitlin Borgmann called the Casey compromise “untenable,” arguing
that, “[i]n trying to strike an impossible compromise on abortion, the
Court in Casey opened the door to physical, familial, and spiritual invasions of women’s privacy that serve little purpose but public sham68
ing and humiliation.” And Professor Maya Manian argued that Ca-

64
65
66
67
68

Devins, supra note 39, at 1322.
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1333–34.
Id. at 1329 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Borgmann, supra note 9, at 291–92.
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sey’s own holdings “failed to deliver on the promise of its rhetoric and
69
to apply the law consistently.”
As a descriptive matter of how Casey has sometimes been applied
70
in the lower courts, either of these accounts might be true. However, this Article seeks to take Casey seriously on its own terms. A close
account of Casey illustrates that the Court’s description and application of the undue burden standard does provide guidance to states as
to how they can regulate abortion, and how they cannot, in order to
safeguard a woman’s ultimate choice. Siegel describes Casey’s limits
on state regulation as “dignity constraints” on the state’s ability to
regulate abortion; the state can regulate abortion expressively but the
dignity constraints ensure that the state cannot do so in ways that violate a woman’s dignity by “restrict[ing] the autonomy of the pregnant
71
woman or treat[ing] her instrumentally, as a means to an end.” In
negotiating the tension in these two sets of constitutional claims, the
Court chose not to adopt a pure balancing test where courts balance
the state’s interest in protecting potential life against a women’s liberty interest in each case. Previous iterations of the undue burden
standard did create such a balancing test. In prior dissents, Justice
O’Connor argued that the undue burden standard should be a
“threshold inquiry,” after which the state would have to justify the
72
regulation with a compelling state interest. The Court rejected this
73
approach. Instead, it erected an autonomy-protecting limit on otherwise permissible state regulation. The state can regulate in the interest of unborn life in many ways—the woman has no right to be “in74
sulated from all others” when making her decision—but regulations
that pose a substantial obstacle to a woman’s ultimate decision are
always unconstitutional under Casey, regardless of the strength of the state’s
countervailing interest. The Court articulated both a purpose and ef69
70

71
72

73
74

Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 250 (2009).
See, e.g., Wharton, Frietsche & Kolbert, supra note 7, at 353 (“With several significant exceptions that reflect the potential vigor and strength of the Casey standard, many lower
federal courts have not been faithful to Casey’s promise.”).
Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1752 (2008).
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. (“The ‘undue burden’ required in the abortion
cases represents the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court
can require a State to justify its legislative actions under the exacting ‘compelling state interest’ standard.”).
See Wharton, Frietsche & Kolbert, supra note 7, at 332 (noting that this approach was “explicitly reject[ed]” in Casey).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
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fect test for determining the validity of state abortion regulation:
state laws can have neither the purpose nor the effect of hindering a
75
woman’s ability to make this choice freely. The space for state expression of its profound respect for potential life is limited to forms
of expression that are respectful of a woman’s decision-making capacity: “A statute with this purpose [of creating a substantial obstacle] is
invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest
in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free
76
choice, not hinder it.”
After Casey, there is no doubt that states can regulate to express
their interest in unborn life in a manner that Roe never previously allowed, creating space for political contestation and democratic
churn. But Casey did not also give carte blanche to states for any regulation of abortion whatsoever. To the contrary, the space for state
action is policed by the boundaries of the undue burden standard,
which is why locating its contours is key to implementing the Casey
compromise. The undue burden standard was designed to “replace
the Roe framework with a rigorous standard that carefully examines
both the actual impact of restrictions on the women they affect and
77
the governmental purpose underlying them.” The Court’s analysis
of the spousal notification requirement reflects this approach. It was
“sensitive to the specific social context in which forced husbandnotification would operate,” and given the findings of fact regarding
the intersection of domestic violence and reproductive freedom, in78
validated the law. Both Casey’s description and application of the
undue burden standard indicate that states have wide discretion to
regulate abortion, but that autonomy-protecting restraints limit that
power when it invades the woman’s ultimate right to autonomous de79
cision-making.
2. The Compromise in Informed Consent: Truthful and Not Misleading
The Court’s doctrinal shift on the acceptability of various informed consent regulations also elucidates the compromise struck in
Casey. In 1976, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
the Court upheld a written informed consent requirement, which re-

75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id.
Wharton, Frietsche & Kolbert, supra note 7, at 331.
Id. at 334.
See Siegel, supra note 71, at 1752 (“Women’s decisional autonomy is a core value the undue burden framework vindicates.”).
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quired a woman to certify “that her consent is informed and freely
80
given and is not the result of coercion.” However, in 1983 and 1986,
in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, the Court
struck down all state-scripted informed consent disclosures and rejected the state’s interest in regulating through informed consent except to vindicate traditional medical informed consent principles of
patient autonomy. The Court’s decisions in Akron and Thornburgh
developed three different rationales for invalidating an abortion informed consent regulation. First, in Akron and Thornburgh, the Court
held that the state was not permitted to place a doctor in an “unde81
sired and uncomfortable straitjacket.” This holding closely aligns
with Roe’s doctor-centered view of the abortion right. Second, in
both cases, the Court held unequivocally that the state could not use
informed consent laws, regardless of their content, in order to “influ82
ence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.”
Third, in Akron (but not Thornburgh), the Court was equally concerned with the fact that the state was using misleading disclosures as
it was with the fact that the state was attempting to persuade women
to choose childbirth. For example, the Court labeled the disclosure
83
that “abortion is a major surgical procedure” as “dubious.” Further,
the Court wrote, the provision that “proceeds to describe numerous
possible physical and psychological complications of abortion, is a
‘parade of horribles’ intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly danger84
ous procedure.” In his dissent in Thornburgh, Justice White reaffirmed
the view that Akron was a case about ensuring that informed consent
provisions do not manipulate or mislead women: “I have no quarrel
with the general proposition, for which I read Akron to stand, that a
campaign of state-promulgated disinformation cannot be justified in
85
the name of ‘informed consent’ or ‘freedom of choice.’” Thus, Akron stands for the proposition that informed consent disclosures, at a
minimum, cannot seek to manipulate or mislead a woman making
her constitutionally-protected choice. The nonmisleading standard,
first remarked upon in Akron, protects a woman’s autonomy by ensur80
81

82
83
84
85

428 U.S. 52, 65–67 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986)
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)
(internal quotation marks omitted); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416, 443 (1983) (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8).
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 443–44).
Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
Id. at 444–45 (emphasis added).
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 800 (White, J., dissenting).
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ing that her decisional process is not inappropriately manipulated by
the state, a right more prominently featured in Casey than in Roe.
The concern regarding misleading and manipulative disclosures,
however, dropped out of the analysis in Thornburgh because the requirements, although intended to dissuade, did not use the same mis86
leading tactics to do so.
Thus, the Court’s prior informed consent law relied on three
principles: (1) the state cannot place the doctor in an “uncomforta87
ble straightjacket” ; (2) the state cannot use informed consent disclo88
sure to seek to persuade women to continue their pregnancies ; and
(3) the state cannot use misleading information in informed consent
89
to manipulate women’s choices . The way that the Court approached the informed consent question in Casey is representative of
the Casey compromise overall. It rejected the two prior absolutist rationales derived from Roe’s fundamental right/trimester framework
and therefore created significant space for expressive informed consent regulation. However, it implemented the third rationale, the
nonmisleading standard of Akron, to protect women’s autonomy.
The Court made clear that the doctor receives no special constitutional protection in the abortion context:
The doctor-patient relation does not underlie or override the two more
general rights under which the abortion right is justified: the right to
make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy. On its own,
the doctor-patient relation here is entitled to the same solicitude it re90
ceives in other contexts.

Further, Casey made clear that the state is no longer prohibited from
expressing a preference for childbirth through informed consent

86

87
88
89
90

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760–61 (Seven explicit kinds of information must be delivered to
the woman at least twenty-four hours before her consent is given, and five of these must
be presented by the woman's physician. The five are: (a) the name of the physician who
will perform the abortion, (b) the “fact that there may be detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not accurately foreseeable,” (c) the “particular medical risks
associated with the particular abortion procedure to be employed,” (d) the probable gestational age, and (e) the “medical risks associated with carrying her child to term.” The
remaining two categories are (f) the “fact that medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care,” and (g) the “fact that the father is liable to assist” in the child's support, “even in instances where the father has offered to pay
for the abortion.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(1)-(2) (1988). The woman also must be
informed that materials printed and supplied by the Commonwealth that describe the fetus and that list agencies offering alternatives to abortion are available for her review.).
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 444–45.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
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regulations: “[W]e permit a State to further its legitimate goal of
protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing
91
the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.”
Nonetheless, the Court maintained and elucidated the nonmisleading requirement that originated in Akron: “If the information the
State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not
92
misleading, the requirement may be permissible.” The opinion is
explicit in explaining that it was overruling Akron and Thornburgh only
insofar as those cases struck down informed consent provisions that
mandated the dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading infor93
mation. The truthful and nonmisleading requirement reinforced
the Court’s earlier holding that regulations must be designed to “in94
form . . . , not hinder,” a woman’s decision-making. Thus, the truthful and nonmisleading standard is part and parcel with, and acts to
implement, the undue burden standard’s underlying principle: the
protection of women’s autonomy.
The compromise is also made visible by the ways in which Casey’s
standard on informed consent deviates from, but also tacks back to,
traditional informed consent principles. In both medical ethics and
common law, informed consent’s primary goal is to provide patients
with sufficient information to enable the patients to make their own
95
medical decisions; patient autonomy is the central principle from
96
which informed consent doctrine proceeds. In contrast, the abortion informed consent regulations have at least the additional goal of
expressing the state’s preference for childbirth over abortion; this is a
91
92
93

94
95

96

Id. at 883.
Id. at 882.
See id. (“To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the
government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information
about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and
the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsistent
with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled.”).
Id. at 877.
See Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking Process, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 808 (1996) (“In theory, the standard for judging the adequacy of the information given is whether the particular patient has the information she
needs to make an informed and intelligent decision about treatment.”).
See id. (“This narrow autonomy model largely governs medical decisionmaking today
through the doctrine of informed consent, which undergirds the law of the doctorpatient relationship.”); see also SHEILA A. M. MCLEAN, AUTONOMY, CONSENT, AND THE LAW
42 (2010) (arguing that informed consent requires providing patients with relevant and
sufficient information for decision-making purposes, and that this obligation is a hallmark of the shift towards greater respect for patient autonomy).
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purpose inherently distinct from enabling patient autonomy. Further, the form of the regulations approved in Casey differs from ordinary informed consent law. Typical informed consent law for a medical procedure is governed by the common law doctrine, which
requires disclosure that conforms to the standard of the profession
(or, in a minority of jurisdictions, that provides the information a reasonable patient would want), and not by specific disclosures mandat97
ed by the state.
Finally, the scope of the mandated disclosures
reaches beyond the ordinary scope of informed consent. Ordinary
informed consent law is narrowly focused on the patient’s understanding of the risks and consequences of the medical procedure to
98
the patient’s body and rarely addresses social or personal context.
Critics argue that this deviation from conventional informed consent principles, sanctioned by Casey, treats women “as decision-makers
less capable than other competent adults,” in need of state assistance
and guidance in ascertaining the appropriate advice from their phy99
sicians that other adults do not require. To some extent, the fact
that the Court approved special informed consent procedures for
abortion that do not exist for any other medical procedures could be
said to “perpetuate[] the stereotypical notion of the indecisiveness of
women . . . [and reflect] stereotypical assumptions that women
100
choose to obtain abortions carelessly.”
However, the extent to
which a regulation reflects these sex stereotypes will depend on the
manner in which the regulation seeks to structure the informed consent process. Where the regulation truly provides for detailed but evenhanded and non-manipulative disclosures regarding the risks, consequences, and alternatives to abortion, the affront to women’s
decision-making capacity is far less than where the state seeks to use
any means, however coercive or manipulative, to “correct” a woman’s
choice to seek an abortion.
This is where the Court’s intervention—by only allowing truthful,
nonmisleading disclosures designed to inform, not hinder, a woman’s
decision—is central to preserving the integrity of a woman’s right to
choose even while allowing for pro-life legislation. The nonmisleading standard also returns abortion informed consent provisions at

97
98
99
100

Goldstein, supra note 95, at 808.
See id. at 815 (“This enlarged vision of the patient’s interests does not represent medicallegal standard practice . . . .”).
Manian, supra note 69, at 252.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting David H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1902
(1995)).
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least partially to traditional informed consent principles. The state
can deviate from the norm by having the goal of expressing a preference for childbirth but only where it also has the goal of informing
and enabling patient autonomy.
How, Professor Maya Manian asks, can a disclosure be “nonmis101
leading” but also “biased in one direction?” Her question is rhetorical, but actually has an answer in Casey. The disclosures in Casey
demonstrate the type of pro-life informed consent legislation that
does not violate the nonmisleading requirement by misdirecting a
woman’s dialogue with her doctor. With respect to the medical risks
of abortion, the Pennsylvania law required disclosure of the risks of
102
both abortion and childbirth.
The Pennsylvania law also required
disclosure of the gestational age of the fetus and information about
103
child support and adoption options. While mandating these types
of disclosures about abortion alternatives channels the expression of
a state preference for childbirth, the Casey disclosures do not inherently mislead a woman’s decision-making process. Presumably, a
woman is already informed about the option of abortion at this stage
in the process (and the regulations require further disclosures about
the nature of the procedures), so disclosure of other options is not
misleading. Further, it is unclear what other information should fairly “counterbalance” the disclosure of the gestational age of the fetus.
Thus, while the Court did approve the expression of a state preference for childbirth in informed consent regulation, it importantly did
not condone disclosures that would mislead and manipulate a woman’s decision-making. Read in light of the overarching aims of the
Casey opinion—respecting the state’s interest in regulating abortion
and maintaining women’s ultimate autonomy—the truthful and
nonmisleading requirement plays a key role in limiting informed
consent regulation to those disclosures that do not impair the goal of
protecting autonomous decision-making.
This Subpart has traced the limits Casey imposes on informed consent regulation and demonstrated that they are pivotal to negotiating
the tension between the competing goals of the undue burden standard. As Robert Goldstein writes, “[i]n a regime in which the woman
has the ultimate choice, it naturally follows that the informed consent
process plays a centrally important role in protecting the woman and
104
the integrity of her decision.” Casey threaded the needle in its ap101
102
103
104

Manian, supra note 69, at 251.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992).
Id.
Goldstein, supra note 95, at 806.
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proach to informed consent regulation. Arguably, informed consent
regulation expressing a preference for childbirth is more respectful
of women’s autonomy than other forms of pro-life legislation. Goldstein explains that the Court’s holding required opponents of Roe to
regulate “in a straightforward and honest manner, rather than sur105
reptitiously by means of a regulatory tax on the abortion decision.”
However, by allowing the state to insert itself into a woman’s decisionmaking process, the dangers of abuse, confusion, and manipulation
threaten to undermine the value of decisional autonomy within the
Casey compromise more so than any administrative hurdle to abortion the state could impose. Seen in this light, the truthful and nonmisleading requirement is the lynchpin to any coherent protection
for women’s decisional autonomy in Casey. The next Part outlines
the most recent forms of abortion regulation in the post-Casey era; in
particular, it focuses on a new generation of doctor-patient dialogue
regulations, different in kind than those approved in Casey, and thus
deserving of close scrutiny under the above framework.
II. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ABORTION REGULATION
Part I established that Casey imposed autonomy (and equality)
preserving constraints on the state’s newfound ability to regulate
abortion to express respect for potential life prior to viability. However, since 1992, states have passed increasingly aggressive antiabortion regulation, different in kind from the regulations approved in
Casey, and thus requiring close constitutional scrutiny. First, this Part
outlines in broad scope the antiabortion strategies that have emerged
in designing antiabortion regulations and their effects on the constitutional landscape of abortion regulation today. Next, it provides a
comprehensive review of the new forms of doctor-patient dialogue
regulation, which this Article terms “dissuasion laws.”
A. Incrementalism and the Women-Protective Antiabortion Argument
After the failed efforts in the 1980s to pass a Human Life constitutional amendment, the mainstream pro-life movement—most notably
106
the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC)—shifted strategies.

105
106

Id. at 806–07.
See generally Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson to Whom it May
Concern (Aug. 7, 2007), available at http://americanrtl.org/files/Documents/nrtlbopp2
0070807memo.pdf (outlining the advantages and disadvantages of various nationwide
pro-life arguments and proposing a general pro-life strategy).
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Instead of seeking the immediate overturning of Roe, either in the
Court or through a constitutional amendment, pro-life advocates focused on an incrementalist strategy for eliminating the abortion
107
right. The incrementalist strategy involves the passage of a wide array of abortion restrictions short of abortion bans, serving a number
of purposes. First, they serve an expressive purpose; through these
restrictions the pro-life community expresses its disapproval of the legality of abortion. Further, the regulations—from mandatory counseling to ultrasound requirements to specific procedure bans—make
access to abortion more difficult. Finally, the incrementalist strategy
seeks to use these incremental regulations to slowly undermine the
108
legal foundations of the abortion right.
Victor Rosenblum and
Thomas Marzen, in an article titled Strategies for Reversing Roe v. Wade
Through the Courts, suggest that incremental regulation can be used to
expand the Court’s recognition of the state interest in the unborn
and widen the state’s interest in maternal health at all stages of preg109
nancy, and thus slowly eliminate the underlying rationales for Roe.
By upholding significant incrementalist regulation for the first
time, Casey self-consciously gave the pro-life community a greater opportunity to pursue this type of legislation. The National Right to
Life Committee remains committed to this approach and has rejected

107

108
109

Alongside the incrementalist strategy, some antiabortion advocates have refocused
their energies on challenging Roe directly by passing abortion bans. In 2012 and 2013,
five states passed abortion bans in direct contradiction to Roe: Arkansas passed a twelveweek ban, North Dakota passed a six-week ban, and three other states passed twenty-week
bans. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE LEGISLATION AND POLICIES ENACTED IN 2013
RELATED TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (Dec. 31, 2013), available at http://www.guttmacher
.org/statecenter/updates/2013Newlaws.pdf; Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights:
2012 State Policy Review, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/
updates/2012/statetrends42012.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). But challenges to these
laws in the lower courts have been, predictably in light of Roe and Casey, successful. The
Supreme Court recently declined the opportunity to reconsider Casey by denying Arizona’s petition for certiorari in Horne v. Isaacson, a Ninth Circuit case striking down Arizona’s twenty-week ban. 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014). Thus, commentators have predicted that
mainstream advocates will continue to focus primarily on an incrementalist approach. See
Natalie Villacorta, Shifting Strategies for State Abortion Battles in 2014, POLITICO (Jan. 7,
2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/abortion-battles-shifting-strategy101811.html.
See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 106, at 6 (noting that incrementalist efforts will “not only
keep the abortion issue alive and change hearts and minds for long-term benefit, but they
also translate into more disfavor for all abortions, which in turn reduces abortions”); see
also Victor G. Rosenblum & Thomas J. Marzen, Strategies for Reversing Roe v. Wade Through
the Courts in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE
COURTS 195, 195–96 (Dennis J. Horan, Edward R. Grant & Paige C. Cunningham eds.,
1987); Siegel, supra note 71, at 1706–13; Smith, supra note 8, at 389–93.
Rosenblum & Marzen, supra note 107, at 195–96.
Id.
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more absolutist approaches espoused by organizations like Person110
hoodUSA —which advocates for personhood initiatives and abortion bans, designed to prompt an outright Roe challenge—as prema111
ture.
The forthcoming survey of recently enacted abortion
legislation, and the limited judicial reaction to regulation thus far,
demonstrates that this has been a “remarkably consistent and success112
ful strategy” on behalf of the pro-life community. In 2011, antiabortion legislators passed a record number ninety-two abortion re113
In 2013, seventy abortion restrictions were
strictions in the states.
114
enacted, the second most in any year.
In sum, more antiabortion
laws were passed between 2011 and 2013 than in the entire previous
115
decade.
In addition to pursuing an incrementalist approach, the pro-life
movement has adopted new rhetoric; it has developed a “womenprotective” discourse for describing the harms of abortion. As Siegel
comprehensively illustrates in her recent work, antiabortion advocates no longer solely focus on the protection of the unborn, but rather, in response to decades of dialogue with the women’s rights
movement, also focus on how the restriction of abortion supposedly
116
protects women.
“[I]n a straight-up battle between fetal interests
and women’s interests,” pro-life advocates concluded, “the woman
117
would win”; so they reimagined the terms of the argument. The
crux of their position is that abortion is necessarily harmful to women, and thus, restriction of abortion is necessary to protect women.
The antiabortion community has sought to sweep in medical, as well
as philosophical, arguments to support its claim by proving the existence of “post-abortion syndrome” (PAS), severe psychological effects

110

111
112
113
114

115
116
117

PersonhoodUSA has led the efforts to pass “personhood” statutes, amendments, and ballot initiatives that define personhood as beginning at fertilization and thus directly challenge Roe. See What is Personhood?, PERSONHOODUSA, http://www.personhoodusa.com/
about-us/what-is-personhood (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 106, at 6 (expressing concern that entertaining more extreme positions would be “would undermine public support for the pro-life position”).
Smith, supra note 8, at 389.
States Enact Record Number of Abortion Restrictions in 2011, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/01/05/endofyear.html.
More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted in 2011-2013 Than in the Entire Previous Decade,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/
2014/01/02/index.html.
Id.
See Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of WomanProtective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1649–50 (2008).
Smith, supra note 8, at 393.
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following abortion, as well as other detrimental physical effects of
118
abortion (such as a link between abortion and breast cancer).
Generally, the mainstream medical community has rejected these
claims. For example, in the late 1980s, antiabortion leaders asked
Ronald Reagan’s Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, a strong opponent of abortion, to document PAS and other negative physical ef119
fects of abortion.
He refused based on the lack of medical evi120
dence.
Despite the dearth of established medical evidence, the fruits of
this effort can be seen in many informed consent statutes discussed
below, which often assert unsupported medical claims about the risks
of abortion. The early success of the joining of the strategies of incrementalism and the women-protective antiabortion argument can
121
be seen in Gonzales v. Carhart. Although Carhart did not change the
122
basic test or underlying principles of Casey, the opinion includes
123
passages that clearly reflect the women-protective argument.
The shift in pro-life reasoning not only changes the political calculus of legislative moves but might also affect the constitutional landscape of abortion regulation. Unpacking the logic of the womenprotective antiabortion argument, Siegel has demonstrated that the
argument rests on sex-stereotypes and assumptions about women’s
“natural role” in the family that our constitutional order has long re124
jected.
The logic of the women-protective argument proceeds as
118
119
120
121
122

123

124

See Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 116, at 1657–64 (discussing the history of the
idea of “post-abortion syndrome”).
Id. at 1662.
Id. at 1663.
550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) (upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,
in part relying on the women-protective arguments against abortion).
See David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future of Abortion Law,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22 (noting that Carhart “reaffirmed the continuing validity and applicability of Casey’s decisive undue burden test”); Priscilla J. Smith, Is the Glass Half-Full?:
Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
(Online) 1, 13 (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357506 (“There is
nothing in the [Carhart] opinion renouncing two of the important limitations the plurality in Casey placed on the Court’s approval of statutes mandating that women receive certain information before they obtain an abortion.”).
E.g., Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (“Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the
bond of love the mother has for her child. The Act recognizes this reality as well.
Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. . . . While we
find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained.”).
See Siegel, supra note 116, at 1688 (“The claim is that by restricting all women, government can free women to be the mothers they naturally are. Woman-protective antiabortion argument is gender-paternalist in just the sense that the old sex-based protective la-
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follows: (1) abortion is always harmful to women; (2) thus, when
women have abortions it is not because of their free choice but rather
because they have been manipulated, misled, and coerced; therefore,
125
(3) restriction of abortion will protect women.
Constitutionally
suspect assumptions about women, Siegel argues, underlie each step
in the analysis. First, the assumptions that women are unable to make
choices in their own interests, and further, that the solution is to restrict their choice (steps two and three), contemplate women as ob126
As Siegel writes, it is reminiscent of “the
jects of limited capacity.
classic form of protection the common-law tradition offered women,
in which restricting women’s agency was the means chosen to protect
and free them: ‘an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in prac127
tical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage’” —a common law tradition that our modern equal protection jurisprudence
128
has rejected.
Moreover, the prior assumption (step one), that abortion always
harms women, is also rooted in constitutionally problematic gender
assumptions. As discussed above, the medical community has rejected most claims regarding the harmful effects, both psychological and
physical, of abortion. Thus, the assumption that abortion harms
women is primarily rooted in the antiabortion community’s norma129
tive priors about the place of women in our society.
David Reardon, a leader of the women-protective argument, states, “While the
research we are doing is necessary to document abortion’s harm,
130
good moral reasoning helps us to anticipate the results.” As Siegel’s
work demonstrates, the argument relies on the belief that abortion
must always harm women because a woman’s natural role is mother.
Reardon argues, “If there is a single principle, then, which lies at the

125
126
127
128
129
130

bor legislation was. It restricts women’s choices to free them to perform their natural
role as mothers.” (emphasis omitted)); Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An
Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1036–38
(2007) [hereinafter Siegel, New Politics] (“Woman-protectionist arguments for regulating
abortion draw persuasive force from familiar stereotypes about women’s agency. . . . [I]t
continues to reason from stereotypes about women’s roles.”).
Siegel, New Politics, supra note 124, at 1017–22.
Id. at 1031–36.
Siegel, supra note 71, at 1778–79 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
Siegel, supra note 71, at 1778–79.
Siegel, New Politics, supra note 124, at 1036–40.
Id. at 1021 (citing Tracking the Effects of Abortion on Women: Interview with David
Reardon of the Elliot Institute, ZENIT (May 12, 2003), available at http://www.zenit.org/
english/visualizza.phtml?sid=35425).
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heart of the pro-women/pro-life agenda, it would have to be this: the
131
best interests of the child and the mother are always joined.”
The foregoing sets the political stage for understanding the proliferation of state abortion regulation in the twenty years since Casey.
States have passed wide-ranging incrementalist abortion regulations.
They have passed limited prohibitions: from bans on the “partial132
birth” abortion procedure, to late-term bans that precede the viabil133
ity line, to bans on abortions sought for race or sex-selective rea134
sons. States have imposed lengthy waiting periods with two-trip re135
quirements, required physician presence for the administration of a
131
132

133

134

135

Id. at 1019 (emphasis omitted) (quoting DAVID C. REARDON, MAKING ABORTION RARE: A
HEALING STRATEGY FOR A DIVIDED NATION 5–6 (1996)).
Partial-birth abortion is now banned federally alongside thirty–two state bans, although
only nineteen state bans are currently in effect. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN
BRIEF: BANS ON “PARTIAL-BIRTH” ABORTION (2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.
org/statecenter/spibs/spib_BPBA.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
The partial birth abortion ban is credited as a significant rhetorical success for prolife politics. The ban focused the popular abortion debate on late-term abortions. Jenny
Westberg’s graphic cartoon illustrations of the procedure were “front and center” in the
ongoing debate. Jenny Westberg, D & X: Grim Technology for Abortion’s Older Victims, LIFE
ADVOCATE, http://lifeadvocate.org/arc/dx.htm; see also SARAH DUBOW, OURSELVES,
UNBORN 169 (2011) (discussing the controversial Westberg cartoons).
In 2010, Nebraska passed an abortion ban beginning at twenty weeks’ gestation based on
the assertion that a fetus can feel pain at this point in the pregnancy, a point far earlier
than commonly accepted notions of viability. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-3,106 (2011). Since
then, eleven other states have followed suit; three of those laws have been enjoined.
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE POLICIES ON LATER ABORTIONS (Feb.
1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf.
In 2010, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Illinois all passed laws barring the practice of sexselective abortion. See Arizona Abortion Law: Requiring an Affidavit Excluding Race or Sex as
Reasons, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011), http://lawprofessors
.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/03/arizona-abortion-law-requiring-an-affidavit-excludingrace-or-sex-as-reasons.html. In March 2011, Arizona passed legislation prohibiting providers from performing abortions sought for sex-selective or race-selective reasons. Id.
Recently, a court dismissed a lawsuit challenging Arizona’s law, holding that the groups
did not have standing to bring the challenge. Katie McDonough, Court Dismisses Lawsuit
Over Arizona’s “Race- and Sex-Selective” Abortion Ban,” SALON (Oct. 4, 2013, 9:54 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2013/10/04/court_dismisses_lawsuit_over_arizonas_race_and_
sex_selective_abortion_ban/. In 2013, North Dakota and Kansas also passed legislation
prohibiting sex-selective abortions. Bob Christie, Arizona Race and Sex-Selective Abortion
Ban Draws ACLU Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2013 5:51 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/29/arizona-abortion-ban-race-sex_n_3355493.html.
Twenty-six states have twenty-four-hour (or shorter) waiting periods, which require women to receive counseling regarding abortion one full day before the procedure.
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR
ABORTION (Feb. 1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_MWPA.pdf. South Dakota’s and Utah’s waiting periods are seventy-two hours. Id.;
H.B. 1217, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011). Ten states’ informed consent laws require
in-person counseling as well as a waiting period and therefore require patients to make
two trips to the clinic. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 135.
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136

medication abortion, and subjected clinics to onerous technical
137
regulations (sometimes threatening to close down all the abortion
138
clinics in a state). For minors, most states have parental notification
139
or consent laws.
Further, states shape access to abortion through
public welfare and private insurance regulations: many states (and
the federal government) limit Medicaid access to abortion to cases of
140
rape, incest, or life endangerment, impose “gag rules” that bar pub141
lic organizations from providing abortion counseling or referrals,
142
and restrict the private market for abortion insurance.
As the non-exhaustive list above demonstrates, the ways in which
the states intervene in matters of abortion access are diverse. All of
these regulations must be analyzed under Casey’s undue burden
framework to ensure that the balance between interests is maintained. For the purposes of this Article, I focus on the most recent
generation of doctor-patient dialogue regulations, which I term dissuasion laws. These laws, which regulate the content of this dialogue,
directly implicate the truthful and nonmisleading standard (which
136

137

138

139

140

141
142

See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MEDICATION ABORTION (Feb. 1, 2014),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf (“[Fourteen]
states require that the clinician providing a medication abortion be physically present
during the procedure, thereby prohibiting the use of telemedicine to prescribe medication for abortion remotely.”).
For example, at least twenty-five states currently restrict abortion care to hospitals or other specialized facilities. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), NARAL PROCHOICE AMERICA, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/abortion/trap-laws.
html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
There is an ongoing court battle to keep Mississippi’s last remaining abortion clinic open,
which Mississippi’s 2012 regulation threatens to shut down. Emily Crockett, Mississippi
Gov. Phil Bryant: ‘My Goal is to End Abortion in Mississippi,’ RH REALITY CHECK (Jan. 31,
2014, 5:25 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/01/31/mississippi-gov-philbryant-goal-end-abortion-mississippi/. Similarly, in 2011, Kansas passed a TRAP law, the
restrictions of which threatened to close down nearly every abortion provider in the state;
however, the law was enjoined before it went into effect. Kate Sheppard, Kansas to Shut
Down All But One Abortion Clinic Friday, MOTHER JONES (June 30, 2011, 12:43 PM), http://
motherjones.com/mojo/2011/06/kansas-shut-down-all-abortion-clinics-friday; Hodes &
Nauser v. Moser, No. 11-02365, 2011 WL 4553061, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2011).
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS’
ABORTIONS (Mar. 1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_PIMA.pdf.
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID (Feb. 1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf; Hyde Amendment
to the Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, §§ 507–08, 802–03, 123 Stat. 595
(2009).
Counseling Bans & Gag Rules, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, http://www.
prochoiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/fast-facts/gag_rules.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: RESTRICTING INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
ABORTION (Feb. 1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib
_RICA.pdf.
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implements in part the undue burden framework) that is the focus of
this Article. Different in kind than the content regulations involved
in Casey, these dissuasion laws require close scrutiny under the truthful and nonmisleading standard to preserve Casey’s compromise.
B. The First and Second Generations of Doctor-Patient Dialogue Regulations:
Informed Consent and Dissuasion
The preceding Subpart provides the landscape of abortion regulation in which laws regulating doctor-patient counseling arise. Casey
upheld a number of doctor-patient mandated disclosures. The Pennsylvania law in Casey required doctors to inform women of (1) the nature of the procedure, (2) the health risks of abortion and childbirth,
143
and (3) the probable gestational age of the fetus. The doctor was
also required to offer the woman state-created materials with information about medical assistance for childbirth, child support, and
144
adoption agencies. In the years directly after Casey, many states unexceptionally adopted laws mirroring the Pennsylvania law. Prochoice advocates object to this type of scripted disclosure, which focuses on the fetus and abortion alternatives, on several grounds: it
forces doctors outside their area of expertise, intrudes in the doctorpatient relationship, and introduces the state’s ideological position
into a woman’s private choice. However, as discussed above in Subpart I.B.2, the disclosures required by this first generation of doctorpatient counseling regulation pose little risk of manipulating the informed consent process to disrupt a woman’s autonomous decisionmaking by misleading, confusing, or overwhelming her. After all, in
Casey, the doctor was required to discuss the health risks of both abortion and childbirth and only had to offer material about alternative
options.
Since then, states have passed laws regulating doctor-patient counseling that differ in kind from those approved in Casey. This Article
labels the new generation of regulation “dissuasion” laws because,
while they share the goal of dissuasion with the first generation, they
no longer necessarily incorporate the respect for patient autonomy
central to any law properly called an informed consent regulation.
Dissuasion laws carry the risk of undermining the second goal of Casey—protection of a woman’s ultimate autonomy in decision-making.
While this Article refers to these laws as “second-generation,” they often bear a striking resemblance to the old law in Akron, which the
143
144

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992).
Id.
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Court deemed misleading, analyzed more closely in Part IV. Therefore, these laws require close scrutiny under the undue burden
framework, and particularly the truthful and nonmisleading standard
that the Court implemented to protect women’s autonomy. The remainder of this Subpart describes the variety of dissuasion laws now
operative in many states.
1. Medically Incorrect and Misleading Risk Disclosures
States have passed laws that go far beyond the Pennsylvania law’s
requirement that a doctor discuss the general risks of abortion.
States have mandated very specific risk disclosures by physicians
and/or included discussion of specific risks in state-created and
mandatorily distributed materials. In many cases the laws clearly misrepresent the risks of abortion. At least five states inaccurately assert
a link between abortion and breast cancer, despite general agree145
ment in the medical literature that no such link exists. Likewise, six
states inaccurately portray the risk of an effect on a woman’s future
146
fertility. Other states raise the specter of infertility in their materials, although the small type accurately states that there is no proven
147
appreciable risk.
Where states misrepresent, or misleadingly present, the risks of abortion, the disclosures can disrupt the ability of
women to properly assess her choices and make an autonomous, informed decision. The core principle of informed consent is to provide the appropriate information in order to enable patient autono148
my. When the information is untruthful or misleading, it cannot be
properly so-termed.
a. PATSD and Negative Mental Health Effects Disclosures
The women-protective argument hinges on the idea that abortion
harms women psychologically. As discussed above, this belief is primarily premised on the intuition that a woman’s best interests will al145
146
147

148

GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 135.
Id.
See, e.g., IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, ABORTION INFORMED CONSENT BROCHURE 10
(2013), available at http://www.state.in.us/isdh/files/Abortion_Informed_Consent_
Brochure.pdf (containing the header “POTENTIAL DANGER TO A SUBSEQUENT
PREGNANCY AND INFERTILITY”).
Goldstein, supra note 95, at 808 (“This narrow autonomy model largely governs medical
decisionmaking today through the doctrine of informed consent, which undergirds the
law of the doctor-patient relationship.”); see also MCLEAN, supra note 96, at 42 (2010) (arguing that informed consent requires providing patients with relevant and sufficient information for decision-making purposes).
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ways be aligned with those of her unborn child. However, psychological studies have consistently refuted the concept of “post abortion
traumatic stress syndrome” (PATSD). For example, a recent comprehensive review by the National Collaborating Centre for Mental
Health of previous peer-reviewed studies concluded that abortion
150
does not raise a woman’s mental health risk.
Nonetheless, at least eight states still inform women in their mandated materials of exclusively negative psychological consequences of
151
abortion. For example, the West Virginia materials state:
Many women suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [Syndrome] following abortion. PTSD is a psychological dysfunction resulting from a
traumatic experience. Symptoms of PTSD include: guilt[,] depression[,] nightmares[,] fear and anxiety[,] alcohol and drug abuse[,]
flashbacks[,] grief[,] suicidal thoughts or acts[,] sexual dysfunction[,]
eating disorders[,] low self-esteem[, and] chronic relationship prob152
lems.

These laws have largely either been approved in litigation or gone
unchallenged. South Dakota’s dissuasion law goes further; it requires
153
physicians to inform women of an increased risk of suicide. A panel
154
of the Eighth Circuit initially enjoined that requirement; however,
the Circuit took the case en banc and reversed, upholding the suicide
155
risk disclosure.
b. Fetal Pain and Survival Laws
Twelve states now either require a physician to disclose information about a fetus’s ability to feel pain or include such information
156
in the state-mandated materials.
The number of states providing
such information to women seeking abortions has more than dou157
bled in the past five years. The laws among these states vary in their

149
150

151
152
153
154
155
156
157

See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, INDUCED ABORTION AND MENTAL
HEALTH (2011), available at http://www.nccmh.org.uk/reports/ABORTION_REPORT_
WEB%20FINAL.pdf.
GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 135.
Abortion Methods & Medical Risks, W.V. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES., http://www.
wvdhhr.org/wrtk/abortioninformation.asp#Abortion_Risks (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2013).
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662
(8th Cir. 2011).
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 135.
Compare id. (noting that twelve states require including “information” that the fetus can
feel pain), with Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The
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particulars. However, none convey the generally accepted medical
consensus on the issue. A 2005 American Medical Association report
indicates that the structures necessary to feel pain develop between
158
twenty-three and thirty weeks gestation. However, even when these
structures develop, a fetus will not feel pain until the structures can
transmit information and the fetus can interpret it. Based on the lit159
tle data available, it is likely this does not occur until thirty weeks.
Fetal pain laws do not reflect this general consensus. For example, Georgia’s materials state,
By 20 weeks gestation, the unborn child has the physical structures necessary to experience pain. There is evidence that by 20 weeks gestation
unborn children evade certain stimuli in a manner which in an infant or
an adult would be interpreted to be a response to pain. Anesthesia is
routinely administered to unborn children who are 20 weeks gestational
160
age or older who undergo prenatal surgery.

Not only does the above not reflect medical consensus, but it may also insert a red herring in a woman’s analysis of the facts of fetal pain.
Medical evidence shows that the anesthesia during the procedure is
161
used for reasons entirely unrelated to fetal pain. In South Dakota,
the materials do not indicate the advanced age required for fetuses to
feel pain, implicitly suggesting that a fetus can feel pain at any stage
of pregnancy: “Findings from some studies suggest that the unborn
162
fetus may feel physical pain.” The Texas materials suggest ability to
163
feel pain may occur as early as twelve weeks gestation.
Along similar lines, some states require disclosures that inaccurately portray the point at which a fetus becomes viable. In Alabama,
after nineteen weeks, a doctor must inform a woman seeking an abortion that (1) the child may be able to survive, (2) she has “the right to
request the physician to use the method of abortion that is most likely
to preserve the life of the unborn child,” and (3) if the child is born

158

159
160

161
162
163

Medical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV.
6, 8–9 (2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/4/gpr090406.html
(noting that five states had such a requirement as of September 2006).
Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence, J. AM.
MED. ASSOC., 947, 947 (2005), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/294/8/
947.full.pdf+html.
Id. at 952.
GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN RES. DIV. OF PUB. HEALTH, ABORTION: A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW,
available at http://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/
PatientEducationBookEN.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
Lee et al., supra note 158, at 947.
Induced Abortion Methods & Risks, S.D. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://doh.sd.gov/abortion/
induced-abortion-methods-risks.aspx?#Risks (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
TEX. DEPT. OF STATE HEALTH SERVS., A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW (2003), available at
http:// www.dshs.state.tx.us/wrtk/pdf/booklet.pdf.
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alive, the attending physician is legally required to take all steps to
164
Despite serious questions regarding the
save the life of the child.
medical validity of these statements, this provision was upheld in fed165
eral court.
The purpose of the fetal pain laws is to encourage women to reconsider their choice to have an abortion based on the possibility that
the fetus can feel pain. If these laws reflected the accepted medical
consensus, they would mirror the Casey regulation and pass muster
under the undue burden standard even though their purpose is dissuasive. However, when the laws misrepresent, or misleadingly present, medical evidence, they can disrupt patient autonomy. Thus, fetal pain laws demonstrate the importance of enforcing Casey’s
truthful and nonmisleading standard to ensure that states respect patient autonomy while furthering the goal of protecting unborn life.
2. Overwhelming Disclosures: The Endless Disclosure Strategy
Dissuasion laws passed in Nebraska in 2010 and South Dakota in
2011 would have required doctors to disclose to patients an enormous amount of information related to the risks of abortion, above
and beyond any ordinary informed consent dialogue. The Nebraska
law, read literally, required doctors to screen women for every “risk
factor,” defined broadly, ever reported to be associated with abortion
and ever published in any peer-reviewed study anywhere at any time,
166
and disclose any “complications” associated with those risk factors.
Because the law did not impose any limitations on these disclosures,
it would have required disclosures of studies even where the findings
were irrelevant to the patient, outdated, or medically disproved by
subsequent research. The District Court of Nebraska granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the law was impossible to comply
167
with and its purpose was to ban abortion in violation of Casey. The
Attorney General agreed to settle the case and a permanent injunc168
tion issued.
The 2011 South Dakota law enacted nearly identical requirements
to the Nebraska bill except it limited the studies to those published in

164
165
166
167
168

ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 (2010).
Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
L.B. 594, 101st Leg., 2nd Sess. (Neb. 2010).
Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb. 2010).
Stipulation to Entry of Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Planned Parenthood
of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb. 2010) (No. 10CV03122), 2010
WL 5758641.
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169

English after 1972.
Those changes likely rebut the “impossibility”
claim Planned Parenthood made in Nebraska, but the law continues
to require disclosure of an overwhelming amount of information,
much of which may be unnecessary or misleading. The District Court
170
of South Dakota enjoined the provision on those grounds.
The Nebraska and South Dakota laws demonstrate how dissuasion
laws can possibly mislead patients even without providing factually incorrect information. Even if the laws are tailored to ensure that no
medically disproven or outdated studies must be disclosed, such laws
may still mislead patients and undermine the autonomy principle of
Casey. Psychological studies demonstrate that our “overall capacity
171
for mental effort is limited” and that an overload of information
and complexity can lead to poor decision-making. In the informed
consent context, research shows that the more information that is
172
provided to the patient, the less she will retain. Part of the goal of
informed consent is to enable patients to make decisions by “select[ing] the information that is most material to the patient, and distill[ing] it into a form that the patient is able to digest and under173
stand.”
Therefore, at some critical point, the amount of
information that the Nebraska and South Dakota dissuasion laws
would have required would have likely disrupted the patient’s ability
to make an autonomous and informed assessment of her options.
Moreover, it is likely that patients would use other informed consent
dialogues with doctors as a baseline for evaluating the abortion counseling and “assume that their physician . . . would not give them in174
formation unless the physician thought [it] was important.” Since
other informed consent dialogues involve vastly less extensive disclosure of risks, patients would likely draw the incorrect inference that
abortion is a particularly risky procedure.

169
170

171
172
173
174

H.B. 1217, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011).
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp.
2d 1048, 1073–75 (D.S.D. 2011). In 2012, South Dakota amended this portion of the law,
removing the challenged risk factor provision and replacing it with a provision requiring
a more specific assessment of “preexisting risk factors associated with adverse psychological outcomes.” H.B. 1254, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012).
Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003).
Declaration of Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D. at 10, Planned Parenthood of Heartland v.
Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb. 2010) (No. 4:10-cv-3122).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 15–16.
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3. “Coerced Abortion Prevention” Screening Requirements
In accordance with the rhetoric of the women-protection argument, several states have passed pro-life laws focused on preventing
coerced abortions. For example, in 2010, both Oklahoma and Tennessee passed laws requiring abortion clinics to post signs indicating
that women cannot be coerced into having an abortion against their
175
wills.
Other states have repeatedly considered laws that would require abortion providers to inform or counsel women on coercion;
others have passed laws specifically prohibiting or criminalizing the
coercion of abortion (although there is little doubt that this activity
176
was already prohibited).
Most of these laws, of course, pose no significant threat to women
seeking abortions. However, some states have gone beyond requiring
women to be informed of their right not to be coerced and have
passed coercion screening requirements. The 2010 Nebraska screening requirement required a physician to “[e]valuate[] the pregnant
woman to identify if the pregnant woman ha[s] the perception of
feeling pressured or coerced into seeking or consenting to an abor177
tion.” Along with the other provisions of this law, the screening re178
quirement has been permanently enjoined. South Dakota now has
a similar coercion screening provision requiring a physician to
[d]o an assessment of the pregnant mother’s circumstances to make a
reasonable determination whether the pregnant mother’s decision to
submit to an abortion is the result of any coercion or pressure from other
persons. In conducting that assessment, the physician shall obtain from
the pregnant mother the age or approximate age of the father of the unborn child, and the physician shall consider whether any disparity in age
between the mother and father is a factor when determining whether the
pregnant mother has been subjected to pressure, undue influence, or
179
coercion.
175
176

177
178
179

AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2010 STATE LEGISLATIVE SESSION REPORT 8 (2010), available
at http://www.aul.org/2010/12/2010-state-legislative-session-report/.
Id.; AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2012 STATE LEGISLATIVE SESSION REPORT 2, 12–13
(2012), available at http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012-SessionReport-_FINAL_-_2_.pdf [hereinafter AMERICANS UNITED, 2012 REPORT]; AMERICANS
UNITED FOR LIFE, 2013 STATE LEGISLATIVE SESSION REPORT 14, 20–21 (2013), available at
http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/2013-State-Session-Report.pdf [hereinafter AMERICANS UNITED, 2013 REPORT]; Mailee R. Smith, 2011 State Legislative Report,
AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE 63, 71 (2011), http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/
state-legislative.pdf.
Heineman, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
Stipulation to Entry of Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, supra note 168.
H.B. 1254, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-56 (1). A very
similar provision in this law’s predecessor bill, H.B. 1217, was initially enjoined. H.B.
1217, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011);. Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota,
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Beyond the statute’s guidance on considering age difference, the
statute provides little guidance on how physicians can make an objective determination as to coercion. Further, it is unclear what the physician should or must do should she find “pressure, undue influence,
or coercion.” Depending on how the law is interpreted, the screening laws threaten to allow (or arguably force) the physician to veto
the patient’s decision to have an abortion should the physician believe that pressure or coercion is at play.
4. Crisis Pregnancy Center Counseling
Crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) are (often religious) antiabortion
organizations that offer pregnancy tests, ultrasounds, and adoption
services. Numerous reports have chronicled CPCs’ use of both misleading and coercive tactics in their efforts to ensure that a woman
180
will not choose to have an abortion. Over the past decade, the visibility of CPCs has increased and states have incorporated them into
their pro-life legislative schemes. A number of states now directly
181
fund pregnancy care centers and other similar organizations. In fifteen of the twenty-nine states that allow production of “Choose Life”
license plates, the proceeds go to CPCs or other antiabortion organi182
zations. In recent years, state legislatures have repeatedly adopted
183
resolutions commending CPCs and their work.
For example, in

180

181
182
183

South Dakota v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1069 (D.S.D. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the coercion requirement was
unconstitutionally vague). Pursuant to a joint stipulation, the slightly revised coercion
provision was permitted to go into effect in July 2012. See Judge Lets Part of South Dakota
Abortion Law Take Effect, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 4, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.ksfy.com/
story/18895959/judge-lets-part-of-south-dakota-abortion-law-take-effect.
See, e.g., Kathryn Joyce, Shotgun Adoption, THE NATION (Aug. 26, 2009),
http://www.thenation.com/article/shotgun-adoption (chronicling the deceptive and
coercive tactics of some CPCs pushing women to give their children up for adoption);
Marc Kaufman, Pregnancy Centers Found to Give False Information on Abortion, WASH. POST
(July 18, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/17/
AR20060717 01145.html (“The report said that 20 of 23 federally funded centers contacted by staff investigators requesting information about an unintended pregnancy were told
false or misleading information about the potential risks of an abortion.”); Julia Silverman, States React to Crisis Pregnancy Centers, WASH. POST (May 9, 2007, 7:23 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/09/.AR20070509
00291.html (“Some states, like Oregon and New York, are trying to increase oversight of
the crisis pregnancy centers out of concern that the information they provide about abortion may be biased or simply wrong.”);
AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2012 REPORT, supra note 176.
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: ‘CHOOSE LIFE’ LICENSE PLATES (2014),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_CLLP.pdf.
AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2012 REPORT, supra note 176.
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2013, these resolutions were passed in Kansas, Texas, and West Vir184
ginia.
Most importantly, the 2011 South Dakota informed consent law
requires a woman to consult with a pregnancy center between her first
mandatory counseling session with her physician and the perfor185
mance of the abortion. That pregnancy center is authorized to discuss alternative options and do its own independent assessment of
whether or not the woman is being coerced. As with other elements
of this law, it is currently preliminarily enjoined pending ongoing lit186
igation.
5. Ultrasound Laws
An increasingly popular form of dissuasion law in this generation
of doctor-patient regulation is the ultrasound requirement. Nineteen
ultrasound measures were introduced in state legislatures in 2011
187
alone. Twenty-three states have laws that regulate the provision of
ultrasounds for women seeking abortions (although two of the laws
188
are permanently enjoined by court order). Most of these laws only
require that the provider offer to perform an ultrasound or, if an ultrasound is provided, that the provider offer the woman the oppor189
tunity to view the image.
But thirteen states have laws requiring
that all women seeking abortions, no matter the stage of their pregnancy, undergo an ultrasound (although, once again, two are en190
joined). Five of those states have ultrasound laws that not only require all women to have an ultrasound, but also state that the
provider must show each woman the image and describe it to her re191
gardless of her wishes. The Oklahoma and North Carolina laws are
192
permanently enjoined; however, the Texas law is currently in force
after the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that the

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

192

AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2013 REPORT, supra note 176, at 27.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-56 (3)(a) (2013).
Planned Parenthood v. Daugaard, 799 F.Supp. 2d 1048 (D.S.D. 2011).
FRC ACTION, STATE PRO-FAMILY LEGISLATIVE REPORT FOR 2011 12 (2011), available at
http:// downloads.frcaction.org/EF/EF11F15.pdf.
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND (2014),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf.
Id.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(4) (2012);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 63-1-738.3d (2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 171.012(4)–(5), 171.0122 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 253.10 (2014).
GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 188.
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law violated the physician’s First Amendment rights,
194
Louisiana and Wisconsin laws.

193

as are the

6. Purely Ideological Disclosures: “Whole, Separate, Unique, Living
Human Being”
In 2005, South Dakota passed a law requiring doctors to inform
women seeking abortions that an abortion ends the life of a “whole,
195
separate, unique, living human being.” The Eighth Circuit upheld
196
this requirement against both Casey and First Amendment claims.
Since the disclosure was upheld in 2008, the law has been replicated
197
in North Dakota, Missouri, and Kansas.
Therefore, in four states,
doctors must now tell women seeking abortions that abortions end
the lives of whole, separate, unique, living human beings, a statement
that essentially assumes the answer to the normative question underlying the abortion debate.
The foregoing (nearly) exhaustive discussion of the new generation of dissuasion regulation of the doctor-patient relationship
demonstrates that (1) the antiabortion groups have taken the opportunity of Casey to drastically expand the reaches of state legislation
and (2) the second generation of doctor-patient regulation is different in kind than the legislation permitted in Casey and, therefore, requires close scrutiny to ensure fidelity to the constraints imposed on
state regulation in Casey.
III. THE TRUTHFUL AND NONMISLEADING STANDARD IN FEDERAL
COURTS
As Part I demonstrates, the truthful and nonmisleading standard
is an important component of the undue burden framework’s autonomy-protecting constraints on the newly approved state regulation of
abortion. However, a review of the lower courts’ implementation of

193
194

195
196
197

Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir.
2012).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(4) (2012);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 63-1-738.3d (2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§
171.012(4)–(5), 171.0122 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 253.10 (2014).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2010).
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724,
733 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.039 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-6709 (2009). A similar provision in Indiana requires a doctor to disclose that “human physical life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm.” IND. CODE
§ 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E) (2013).
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the truthful and nonmisleading standard—particularly the nonmisleading component—demonstrates that the lower courts have not
developed the analytical tools for determining what types of disclosures violate the standard.
Initially, the lower courts were mostly faced with challenges to
first-generation informed consent laws, which they approved solely by
analogy to the Pennsylvania law approved in Casey. And as challenges
to second-generation dissuasion laws mount, lower courts appear to
be deferring to Casey’s goal of enabling state regulation of abortion,
often to the detriment of close analysis of autonomy-protecting constraints of Casey. In doing so, the courts often either use the doctor’s
198
ability to comment on the disclosures to “assuag[e]” concerns regarding the misleading nature of the required disclosures or require
doctors to provide additional information not outlined in the statute
to cure the defect in the statute’s disclosures. These holdings fundamentally misunderstand the imposition of the nonmisleading requirement on the state itself, not the doctor, and lead to odd results
requiring doctors to give paradoxical and confusing disclosures.
Moreover, several lower courts’ analyses focus solely on technical
truthfulness and allow the nonmisleading component of the standard
to drop out altogether. Some recent challenges to the more aggressive dissuasion laws appear to have caught the courts’ attentions, but
the case law is still bereft of clear analysis of what misleading means in
the Casey context. Without further elaboration, the standard could
dissolve into solely a smell test for technical accuracy that cannot perform the autonomy-protecting function it was developed to perform.
The courts have used a doctor’s ability to comment or elaborate
on the required disclosures in two distinct ways to bypass “truthful
and nonmisleading” challenges to dissuasion laws. First, in numerous
cases, the courts point to the fact that doctors can elaborate on or fur199
ther explain required disclosures to “assuag[e]” any constitutional
concerns that the required disclosure is misleading. Courts have particularly relied on this reasoning to approve father liability and medical assistance provisions. In Karlin v. Foust, the district court wrote,
When women are told that fathers are liable for assistance, some women
may be misled into believing that they will be able to obtain child support. But there is nothing in the statute that prevents a physician from

198
199

Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 492 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id.
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informing women that although the law makes the father liable for assis200
tance, obtaining that assistance may be difficult.
201

The Seventh Circuit upheld this reasoning.
The Eight Circuit followed suit in Fargo Women’s Health Organization v. Schafer, bolstering its
decision that the medical assistance and father liability provisions
were not misleading by construing the statute to allow the physician
202
or agent to comment on the information.
Likewise, in A Woman’s
Choice—East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, the district court relied on
the doctor’s ability to comment to dismiss claims that the law’s required disclosures—“‘medical assistance benefits may be available’
and . . . the father of the unborn fetus is ‘legally required to assist in the
203
support of the child’” —was misleading: “No one claims that this information provides a complete picture of relevant facts on either of
these issues. However, the law does not forbid anyone from providing additional information about either the eligibility criteria for
medical assistance or the practical realities of collecting child support
204
from fathers.”
The reasoning in these cases makes a critical error in interpreting
Casey and thus erodes the protection of the truthful and nonmisleading standard. Casey imposes limits directly on the state. The state
must not require disclosures that, standing alone, are misleading; it is
not relevant to the constitutional standard if individual doctors may
remedy the state’s misleading guidance with their own explanations.
In these cases, the elaboration is not required of doctors, thus the assurance of constitutional state-required informed consent dialogue (a
dialogue that will not mislead a woman’s decision making) will be left
to the discretion of the woman’s doctor; this is not the result Casey
demands. In Karlin, the court recognized that the state-required disclosure might mislead women, but found it sufficient that the statute
did not prevent physicians from remedying this with their own state205
ments.
This reasoning inverts the Casey standard, requiring only
that the statute not prohibit a doctor from curing the state’s misleading disclosure rather than affirmatively requiring the disclosure not
to be misleading itself.

200
201
202
203
204
205

Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1218 (W.D. Wis. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds,
188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
Karlin, 188 F.3d at 492.
18 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 1994).
904 F. Supp. 1434, 1451 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citation omitted).
Id.
Karlin, 975 F. Supp. at 1218.

May 2014]

TRUTHFUL BUT MISLEADING?

1395

In other cases, the courts have required doctors to elaborate on the
state-mandated disclosures in order to remedy their misleading character. In Karlin v. Foust, the challenged statute also required a physician to inform any woman seeking an abortion that “auscultation of
fetal heart tone services are available that enable a pregnant woman to
206
hear her unborn child’s heartbeat.” Plaintiffs challenged the provision as misleading because the majority of women seek abortions before ten to twelve weeks of pregnancy, the point at which a fetal
heartbeat can be detected. While the district court agreed that the
provision was misleading, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court
required individual physicians, without the direction of the text of
the statute, to fill in the gaps in the misleading statutory text: “[T]he
language of the provision is not so narrow as to preclude a physician
from being able to fully explain the availability of the identified services. Indeed, we see no reason why the provision would not also ne207
cessitate a physician to fully explain these services at issue.”
Likewise, the court construed the statute, which provided an extensive list
of risks—including “risks” rejected by the mainstream medical community such as psychological trauma, danger to subsequent pregnancies, and infertility—to be disclosed to patients, to require doctors to
use their best medical judgment in characterizing those risks. Indeed, the doctor would, if it was in his best medical judgment, be required to discuss the “risk” of psychological trauma even if only to
discount it: “This means that if a physician believes that no psychological trauma is associated with the abortion procedure to be used,
208
that is what the statute requires him or her to tell the patient.”
The district court in Alabama took the same approach to another
second-generation regulation. In 2002, Alabama passed a law that,
among other requirements, requires a physician to tell a woman seeking an abortion after nineteen weeks gestational age that
a. The unborn child may be able to survive outside the womb[,] b. The
woman has the right to request the physician to use the method of abortion that is most likely to preserve the life of the unborn child, provided
such abortion is not otherwise prohibited by law[,] c. If the unborn child
is born alive, the attending physician has the legal obligation to take all
209
reasonable steps necessary to maintain the life and health of the child.

206
207
208
209

Karlin, 188 F.3d at 491 (emphasis added).
Id. at 492.
Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1227 (W.D. Wis. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds,
188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1198 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
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Plaintiffs argued that such a statement is likely medically incorrect
and at minimum misleading. Therefore, “in order to construe the
Act as in compliance with Casey’s truthful or not misleading standard,” the court held:
[P]hysicians and qualified persons must go beyond a simple mechanical
reading of the provision and provide the woman with the following information: 1) a full and complete definition of the term ‘survive’ in accordance with the physician’s good faith clinical judgment; 2) the nature
of any survival; 3) survival is merely a possibility; 4) survival will or may be
210
of extremely limited duration.

These holdings escape some of the criticisms above with respect to
cases where the courts only mention the ability of doctors to comment. However, by requiring doctors to use their medical judgments
to cure facially false disclosures requirement, the courts create
strange results that may solve the “truthfulness” problem but ignore
the heart of the nonmisleading standard. For example, after the decision in Karlin, many doctors are required to make disclosures like “I
am required to tell you that auscultation services are available to enable you to hear the heartbeat of your unborn child. However, since
you are only x weeks pregnant, you will not be able to hear a heartbeat.” And “I should warn you of the risk of psychological trauma; I
believe there is none.” The court did not consider how the patient is
likely to interpret these statements or react to the specter of psychological trauma or detectable fetal heartbeats. It is unclear what purpose these disclosures can further except to confuse the patient.
The court’s interpretation of the survival clause in the Alabama
statute stretches the bounds of constitutional avoidance. The avoidance doctrine is meant only as a tool for choosing among reasonably
available interpretations of the statute. The requirements the court
imposed on doctors are nowhere to be found within the four corners
of the text. But more importantly, the court’s interpretation does not
solve the misleading problem. For the many physicians (perhaps all
who perform abortions) who believe that the survival statement is
medically false, the result of the court’s holding will be similar to that
in Karlin. The physician would be forced to say something that reduces to, “Your unborn child may be able to survive outside the
womb. However I do not think that your unborn child would be able
to survive outside the womb in any meaningful sense.” While the
court may once again have solved the easier problem of ensuring that

210

Id. at 1203.
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a disclosure is not false, the court did not truly engage in considering
211
what may be misleading to patients.
Other doctor-patient regulation challenges demonstrate the lower
courts’ limited engagement thus far with the meaning of the nonmisleading standard and nearly complete deference to the state interest
in regulation recognized in Casey. In Eubanks v. Schmidt, a district
court declared ipso facto that color-enhanced and enlarged photos
212
were not misleading without any discussion of its reasoning.
The
court also upheld state-created and mandatorily distributed materials
despite evidence at trial that proved that an agency listed in the state
213
materials provided misleading information to patients.
The court
held that the misleading character of the agency’s actions did not affect the character of the materials themselves: “Casey does not require, however, that every statement made by every agency identified
be truthful and nonmisleading, merely that the pamphlets themselves
214
meet those requirements.” The result may be that the state can use
its materials to guide women to crisis pregnancy centers and other
organizations that have a documented practice of providing misleading information. Such a ruling opens up the possibility for the state
to do by proxy what it cannot do directly; the court did not analyze
how this squares with the purposes behind the nonmisleading standard. Moreover, in Fargo Women’s Health, despite Casey’s guidance, the
court focused on the likely effect on all patients rather than those af215
fected by the provision. While analyzing a provision that required
doctors to tell women about the availability of medical assistance and
father liability for child support (information that was only included
in the optional state materials in Casey), the Eighth Circuit reasoned
“[i]f in certain cases such a statement would be misleading or false, it

211

212
213
214
215

The court did temporarily enjoin the promulgation of the state materials on the ground
that some of the information “may” have violated Casey’s truthful and not misleading requirement. Id. at 1204–05. However, its holding was at best ambivalent. The court based
its decision to preliminarily enjoin the materials on three factors: 1) they may not have
complied with the statute itself, 2) some experts presented conflicting testimony on the
factual accuracy of the materials, and 3) the legislature’s directive indicated that the materials were not essential to the Act’s taking effect. Id. at 1205. One interesting note,
however, on the portion of the opinion is the court’s recognition of how false or misleading materials may interact with and hinder the right; “[i]ndeed, these concerns are bolstered by the magnitude of the decision to have an abortion as well as the potential persuasiveness that state approved materials may have in this context.” Id.
126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
Id. at 458
Id. at 459.
Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 533 (1994).
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would undoubtedly be because of unique and personal background
216
facts that would be at least suspected if not known to the woman.”
217
The Eighth Circuit Rounds decisions demonstrate how consideration of what is misleading in informed consent regulations has
dropped out entirely in many courts’ analyses of abortion restrictions.
First, in 2008, the Eighth Circuit court held en banc that South Dakota’s informed consent law, which required physicians to inform women that the abortion will terminate the life of a “whole, separate,
unique, living human being,” is true, not misleading, and constitu218
tionally permissible.
While the court recognized that “[t]aken in
isolation,” such a statement “may be read to make a point in the de219
bate about the ethics of abortion,” the court considered the statutory definition of “human being,” provided in a separate section of the
statute, sufficient to remedy any constitutional problems. The statute
defined “human being” as “an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being during the
220
entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation.”
Reasoning that, by this definition of human being, the statement that
an abortion terminates a member of the species Homo sapiens is scientifically true, the court concluded that the disclosure was permissi221
ble.
The court’s reading implies that the question of what is “misleading” entirely rises and falls with the question of what is “truthful.”
Many of the depositions and affidavits in the case focused on whether
222
it was “true” that a fetus is a “member of the species Homo sapiens.”
The court relied on this evidence to summarily conclude that the
statement was true and, thus, also not misleading. As the dissent explained, the court did not consider the effect of the modifiers
“whole,” “separate,” “unique,” or “living,” but rather accepted wholesale the defense’s explanation of why the state considered that state-

216
217
218
219
220
221
222

Id. at 534.
See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724,
735, 738 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Id. at 735.
Id. at 727 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 736.
See, e.g., Declaration of Dr. David Fu-Chi Mark at 2 Planned Parenthood Minnesota,
North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-4007), 2005
WL 3531296 (explaining that South Dakota House Bill 1166’s definition of a “human being” as an “‘individual living member of the species Homo sapiens,’ including human beings living in utero, makes it clear that the statement under [§ 7(1)(b)] is stated as a scientific fact and nothing more”).
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ment to be true.
In one sentence, the court dismissed Planned
Parenthood’s argument regarding the inherently misleading, if not
factually untrue, nature of the disclosure: “Planned Parenthood’s evidence and argument rely on the supposition that, in practice, the patient will not receive or understand the narrow, species-based definition of ‘human being’ in § 8(4) of the Act, but we are not persuaded
224
that this is so.”
The court provided no explanation for why it is persuasive that
women will understand this as a purely factual scientific disclosure
despite its natural reading as a moral and philosophical one. It seems
fair to assume that the question of whether this statement is misleading—in the sense that it uses the authority of the state and the physician to make an unsettled moral assertion as if it were a factual and
settled one—is at least a colorable one to be substantively addressed.
The court’s failure to explain how it thinks women will understand
this statement, and how that bears on whether it is misleading, is particularly troublesome, because it is difficult to imagine what reasonable other meaning or purpose could be assigned to the disclosure. As
Robert Post argues, “[i]t hardly seems plausible that a woman could
be confused about whether she is carrying the biological fetus of a
225
zebra, a raccoon, or a bat.”
When this case returned to the district court, the court struck
down the provision requiring doctors to inform women of “all known
medical risks . . . including an [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and
suicide” and the requirement that doctors advise a woman that she
“has an existing relationship” with the fetus that “enjoys protection
under the United States Constitution and under the laws of South
226
Dakota.”
But even though the lower court found the latter provision to be untruthful and misleading because it could find no basis in
227
South Dakota or United States constitutional law for it, the Eighth
Circuit panel accepted the strained construction that this disclosure
only requires a woman to be informed that she “is legally and consti228
tutionally protected against being forced to have an abortion.”
223
224
225
226

227
228

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 744–45 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 735 (majority opinion).
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 954 (2007).
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d
972, 977–79, 982–83 (D.S.D. 2009) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 978–79.
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662,
669 (8th Cir. 2011).
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Once again, the court failed to consider how this provision would be
interpreted by the patient when analyzing the possibly misleading nature of the required disclosure.
Finally, although both the district court and the Eighth Circuit
panel found the suicide ideation and suicide disclosure to be not only
229
misleading, but also false, the Eighth Circuit took the case en banc
230
and reversed this holding. In holding the disclosure “truthful,” the
en banc court did somersaults to construe the term “increased risk”
not to imply any causal relationship. For example, the court explained: “There is a very real difference between (1) a statement that
an action places an individual at an increased risk for an adverse outcome, and (2) a statement that, if the individual experiences the ad231
verse outcome, the action will have been the direct cause.” But it is
questionable whether, to a layperson receiving medical advice on a
procedure, there is a “very real difference” between those statements.
And in any event, the question in determining the truthfulness of the
disclosure is not whether the term “increased risk” implies that “the
action will have been the direct cause” but rather if the term implies
any causal relationship at all (because there is no medical evidence
that adequately demonstrates any causal relationship between abortion and suicide or suicide ideation). The en banc court concluded
232
that it does not. Therefore, it concluded that correlative evidence
was sufficient to support the required disclosure.
In analyzing the disclosure under the nonmisleading standard,
the en banc court seemingly acknowledged that, without any proof of
causation, the disclosure would be misleading or irrelevant. But
then, the court turned the nonmisleading standard on its head. The
question was no longer whether the disclosure misleadingly suggests
to the patient an unproven causal link between abortion and suicidal
ideation or suicide. The court did not consider whether the patient
would assume at least some proof of causation in light of the required
disclosure. Rather, the court held that the disclosure, which it admitted is only relevant to the extent it suggests causation, is not misleading unless “Planned Parenthood . . . show[s] that abortion has been
ruled out, to a degree of scientifically accepted certainty, as a statisti233
cally significant causal factor in post-abortion suicides.”
In other
229
230
231
232
233

Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 982–83; Rounds, 653 F.3d at 670–73.
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889,
906 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Id. at 896.
Id. at 889
Id. at 900.
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words, the state has no affirmative obligation to ensure that its required disclosures do not misleadingly imply unproven inferences; a
state-required disclosure is only unconstitutional if a plaintiff can
demonstrate, with absolute certainty, that the implied inferences of a
disclosure are false. With this impossibly high standard in place, the
court rejected Planned Parenthood’s evidence rebutting any causal
link.
The en banc court’s analysis essentially eliminated Casey’s affirmative requirement that informed consent disclosures “must be calcu234
lated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.” In Part I,
this Article established that the purpose of the truthful and nonmisleading standard is to preserve a woman’s autonomy in her decisionmaking process. But the court’s analysis in Rounds entirely ignored
the effect of the challenged disclosure on a woman’s autonomy. The
court never considered the way in which such a disclosure, unsupported by medical evidence, might manipulate a woman’s autonomous decision-making.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the lower courts’ reluctance
to rigorously apply the truthful and nonmisleading standard in light
of the autonomy principle in Casey. Until recently, no opinion had
ever declared a state’s informed consent law misleading. However, a
few recent decisions demonstrate that the lower courts are still willing
to consider such challenges but lack the analytical tools to analyze
what is misleading under Casey. In July 2010 and June 2011, district
court decisions in Nebraska and South Dakota, respectively, temporarily enjoined the laws requiring doctors to discuss every recorded
235
“risk factor” for abortion, discussed above in Subpart II.B.2.
Both
courts held that, because the literal language of the bills would certainly require doctors to discuss invalid and outdated medical studies
asserting refuted claims such as the breast cancer link, the laws required the dissemination of untruthful and misleading information.
These opinions represent a step towards recognizing the importance
of this standard to maintaining the balance of Casey. But perhaps because the information required in these cases was so blatantly untruthful, the cases still do not provide much structure for future analysis under the nonmisleading standard.

234
235

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1046, 1048–49 (D.
Neb. 2010); Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Daugaard,
799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1072 (D.S.D. 2011).

1402

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:5

236

Recently, in Stuart v. Loomis, a district court recognized and applied the autonomy-protecting principle within Casey’s informed consent holdings. The court found North Carolina’s ultrasound law—
which required a doctor to display and explain an ultrasound image
to a patient even if the woman refused to look or listen—irrelevant to
any proper informed consent dialogue, and therefore unconstitutional under Casey. The court explained,
Instead of a “reasonable framework” within which a woman makes the
decision about terminating a pregnancy, the speech-and-display provision
is more like an unyielding straightjacket. It goes well beyond “encourag[ing the pregnant woman] to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of
continuing the pregnancy to full term” and “taking steps to ensure that
[her] choice is thoughtful and informed.” By requiring providers to deliver this information to a woman who takes steps not to hear it or would
be harmed by hearing it, the state has erected an obstacle and has moved
from “encouraging” to lecturing, using health care providers as its
mouthpiece. As discussed above, there is no health reason for requiring
the disclosure to women who take steps not to hear it or would be
harmed by hearing it, making this an “unnecessary health regulation[]”
237
which is not allowed under Casey.

The court’s reasoning in Loomis takes Casey’s truthful, nonmisleading,
and relevant requirement seriously and applies the relevance prong
in a manner that effectuates Casey’s purpose: preserving a woman’s
autonomous decision-making. The following part fleshes out a theory by which courts can consistently apply the nonmisleading requirement to the same end.
IV. REVIVING THE NONMISLEADING REQUIREMENT: A RENEWED
ANALYSIS OF AKRON, THORNBURGH, AND CASEY
As discussed above, a number of scholars have commented on the
various ways in which the principles of Casey have eroded and pro238
posed strategies for rebuilding the decision’s foundation. Further,
a look at the case law suggests a possible resurgence of First Amendment compelled speech claims. Plaintiffs were successful in the district courts in both Texas and North Carolina in challenging the
forced ultrasounds with physician explanations on compelled speech
grounds (although the Texas decision was reversed by the Fifth Cir-

236
237
238

No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 186310 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014).
Id. at *38 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
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cuit). This Article contributes to this literature by focusing on the
content and enforcement mechanisms for the truthful and nonmisleading standard, as a part of the overarching undue burden framework governing abortion restrictions.
For the reasons outlined in Parts I and II, this Article suggests that
a better understanding of the truthful and nonmisleading standard is
an important contribution to any discussion regarding the revival of
the autonomy-protecting principle in Casey. Abortion restrictions act
on women in a variety of ways, but dissuasion laws are increasingly
common and the focus of significant constitutional litigation. The
truthful and nonmisleading standard was designed to regulate these
laws in particular. Although Casey overruled portions of Thornburgh
and Akron, it was careful to limit its holding:
To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when
the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant
health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestation age’ of
the fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowl240
edgement of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled.

As discussed above, a close reading of Akron, Thornburgh, and Casey
together demonstrates that the truthful and nonmisleading standard
derives from concerns regarding women’s autonomy first outlined in
Akron. By reexamining the origins of the standard, it becomes clear
that much of Akron is still good law and provides a useful starting
point for determining how courts should approach the nonmisleading standard to faithfully implement the autonomy-protecting constraints in Casey. A more robust understanding of the nonmisleading
standard will have the benefits of (1) protecting the autonomy central to Casey; (2) uncovering impermissible purposes in state regulation; and (3) providing a framework for challenging statutes that are
based solely on impermissible gender stereotypes.
A. Retracing Akron — The Origins of the Nonmisleading Standard
In 1983, the Court considered a challenge to an Ohio statute that
regulated abortions in a manner remarkably similar to today’s se241
cond-generation dissuasion laws. The law limited the performance
239

240
241

Stuart, 2014 WL 186310, at *38, *42; Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 976–78 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated by Texas Med. Providers
Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 2012).
Planned Parenthood of South Eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992)
(emphasis added).
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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of abortions to hospitals and imposed specific disclosures and a twenty-four-hour waiting period before a woman could certify her informed consent to an abortion. The informed consent disclosures
included, (1) that according to the physician’s best judgment, the
woman is pregnant; (2) the number of weeks since the probable conception; (3) “that the unborn child is a human life from the moment
of conception” and a detailed description of the anatomical and
physiological characteristics of the unborn child of that pregnancy
“including, but not limited to, appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity,
including pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, the
presence of internal organs and the presence of external members”;
(4) if after 22 weeks, that the child may be viable and capable of surviving outside the womb, and that “her attending physician has a legal obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve the life and
health of her viable unborn child during the abortion”; (5) that abortion is “a major surgical procedure which can result in serious complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in
subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological problems she may
have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances”; (6) the availability of public and private agencies that can provide birth control
information; and (7) the availability of public and private agencies to
assist her during pregnancy and after birth, including adoption op242
tions. Further, the physician was required to disclose the particular
risks attendant to the specific pregnancy and the abortion technique
to be employed.
Since the law challenged in Akron is more akin to the secondgeneration informed consent laws than the law challenged in Casey,
the Court’s approach to the law in Akron, to the extent we can determine it was not overruled in Casey, should be helpful to lower courts
in determining the constitutionality of today’s similar regulations.
Since Casey, it appears that both scholars and courts alike have mistakenly considered all of Akron to be overruled and irrelevant. Therefore, consideration of how its remaining holdings may inform the Casey decision has been under-theorized.
As Part I established, parts of Akron focused on the right of the
doctor not to be placed in an “undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket” and suggested that the State could not seek to dissuade wom-

242

Id. at 423 n.5.
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en through informed consent laws from seeking an abortion.
In
those two respects—special solicitude for the rights of the doctor and
the absolute prohibition on expressing a preference for childbirth—
Akron is no longer reliable law.
However, a close reading of the Court’s evaluation of the informed consent provisions demonstrates that its primary concern was
the misleading nature of the disclosures. As to the requirement to
disclose that “the unborn child is a human life,” the Court indicated
that such a statement was directly inconsistent with Roe and therefore
244
could not be adopted by a state in an informed consent regulation.
Further, the Court indicated that a detailed description of the specif245
The
ic fetus’s development would involve “at best speculation.”
Court was clearly concerned about the accuracy of the information
and its likelihood to confuse or misinform a patient during her decision-making process. In particular, the Court was concerned with the
statute’s attempt to create the misleading impression that abortion is
excessively risky to one’s health. The Court labeled the statement
246
“abortion is a major surgical procedure” as “dubious.” Finally, the
Court described the risk disclosures as a “‘parade of horribles’ intended to
247
suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous procedure.”
Thus, it was primarily to the misleading nature of the aggressive
informed consent disclosures that the Court objected. In fact, in a
footnote the Court indicated that it saw no problem per se with the
248
pregnancy, gestational age, or adoption agency disclosures. Those
249
provisions were struck down on an entirely different ground. These
are precisely the disclosures that the Akron statute had in common
with the statute in Casey. The Court only found impermissible, in and

243
244
245
246
247
248

249

Id. at 443–44 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
67 n.8 (1976)).
Id. at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
Id. at 445 n.37 (“These four subsections require that the patient be informed by the attending physician of the fact that she is pregnant, § 1870.06(B)(1), the gestational age of
the fetus, § 1870.06(B)(2), the availability of information on birth control and adoption,
§ 1870.06(B)(6), and the availability of assistance during pregnancy and after childbirth,
§ 1870.06(B)(7). This information, to the extent it is accurate, certainly is not objectionable, and probably is routinely made available to the patient.”).
Id. (“We are not persuaded, however, to sever these provisions from the remainder of §
1870.06(B). They require that all of the information be given orally by the attending
physician when much, if not all of it, could be given by a qualified person assisting the
physician.”).
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of themselves, those disclosures that the Court determined were misleading, giving an unfair impression of the procedure.
Thus, the Casey Court’s limitation of its overruling of Akron and
Thornburgh only to the extent that they struck down “truthful and
nonmisleading disclosures” can be read to specifically retain the portions of Akron concerned with misleading and manipulative disclosures by incorporation.
A comparison of Thornburgh and Akron supports this proposition
and suggests that Casey was primarily overruling Thornburgh, not Akron, with respect to the content of disclosures. Unlike the statute in
Akron, the statute in Thornburgh bore significant resemblance to the
statute approved in Casey. In fact, the statute in Casey was a reincarnation of the Thornburgh statute. It required the disclosure of seven
pieces of information:
(a) the name of the physician . . . , (b) the “fact that there may be detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not accurately foreseeable,” (c) the “particular medical risks associated with the particular
abortion procedure to be employed,” (d) the probable gestational
age, . . . (e) the “medical risks associated with carrying her child to
term” . . . [,] (f) the “fact that medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care,” and (g) the “fact
250
that the father is liable to assist” in the child’s support . . . .

The law also mandated the provision of state-mandated materials that
would describe the development of the fetus and provide information
251
about alternatives to abortion.
Unlike Akron, where the Court focused on the problematic content of the disclosures, the Court in
Thornburgh relied only on the two propositions that Casey later overruled. First, the provisions were unconstitutionally designed to per252
suade a woman not to seek an abortion.
Second, the regulation
placed the doctor in an “undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket,”
thus imposing “state medicine” on the woman and barring the pro253
fessional guidance she would ordinarily expect from her physician.
The Court did not consider whether the disclosures were “dubious,”
misleading, or similarly problematic; with the exception perhaps of
section (b), the disclosures were far too straightforward to support
such an assertion.
Justice White’s dissent in Thornburgh affirms this interpretation of
Akron. In fact, the truthful and nonmisleading standard in Casey was

250
251
252
253

Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760–61 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 762–63.
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likely lifted from his discussion of Akron in the Thornburgh dissent.
Justice White wrote,
I have no quarrel with the general proposition, for which I read Akron to
stand, that a campaign of state-promulgated disinformation cannot be
justified in the name of ‘informed consent’ or ‘freedom of choice.’ But
the Pennsylvania statute before us cannot be accused of sharing the flaws
254
of the ordinance at issue in Akron.

Two paragraphs later, Justice White outlined precisely the “truthful
and nonmisleading” standard articulated in the plurality opinion in
Casey: “It is in the very nature of informed-consent provisions that
they may produce some anxiety in the patient and influence her in
her choice. This is in fact their reason for existence, and—provided
that the information required is accurate and nonmisleading—it is an en255
tirely salutary reason.” In other words, informed consent provisions
will, by their nature, always tend to either support or not support the
decision to have an abortion. But providing a woman with truthful
and nonmisleading information that is pertinent and “may affect her
choice” is constitutionally acceptable.
Given the close relationship between the law in Thornburgh and
the nearly identical law the Pennsylvania legislature passed just a few
years later resulting in the Casey decision, it is likely that the truthful
and nonmisleading standard articulated in Justice White’s dissent is
256
an important antecedent of the Casey standard. Therefore, his stark
comparison of what he describes as the “campaign of statepromulgated disinformation” in the Akron provisions with the Thornburgh provisions should provide a starting point for any Casey nonmisleading analysis.
What is notable is that the disclosures that Justice White labels
“state-promulgated disinformation” are nearly identical to many provisions in current dissuasion regulations. The requirement that a
doctor inform a woman “that the unborn child is a human life from
the moment of conception” is a precursor to the “whole, separate,
257
unique, living human being” disclosures.
Since the Court applied
the nonmisleading standard in Akron to strike down that provision,

254
255
256

257

Id. at 800 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 801 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
The standard can also be found in the First Amendment commercial speech context,
which was addressed in the Third Circuit opinion in Casey, and therefore likely influenced the Court’s decision. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
947 F.2d 682, 705–06 (3d Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, the nonmisleading strand traced from
Akron to Thornburgh to Casey more closely aligns with the underlying principles of Casey as
outlined in Part I.
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 423 n.5 (1983).
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the history of the nonmisleading standard casts doubt on the South
Dakota provision upheld in Rounds. Likewise, the survival disclosures
disapproved of in Akron bear a close resemblance to the disclosure
258
upheld in Summit Medical Center.
Finally, the risk disclosures that
Justice Lewis Powell described as a disingenuous “parade of horribles” match many current mandatory dissuasion regulations, as discussed above in Part II.
The nonmisleading analysis in Akron did not concern itself with
whether any particular statement could be defended as truthful as a
technical matter, but instead considered what the overall effect of the
disclosures would be on the patient and whether it would create a
misleading impression. Justice White approved of this analysis in his
Thornburgh dissent, indicating that informed consent regulations
should be limited to those that are neither untruthful nor mislead259
ing; that analysis was borrowed by the Casey majority.
Tracing the
history of the truthful and nonmisleading standard demonstrates that
(1) the Court has consistently been concerned with misleading disclosures, not only technically untruthful disclosures, in order to safeguard the autonomy of a woman’s decision that is at the core of the
abortion right and (2) much of Akron is still good law and provides a
useful starting point for any analysis of whether an informed consent
regulation is misleading, and thus, unconstitutional under Casey.
B. The Nonmisleading Standard: Protecting the Autonomy Value in Casey
in Application
1. The Nonmisleading Standard in Multiple Roles: Serving Multiple
Constitutional Purposes
As the foregoing Parts have established, a more robust vision of
the nonmisleading requirement in light of Casey’s goals should aid
courts in enforcing the autonomy-protecting principle within Casey.
The question that can be gleaned from Akron is whether the required
disclosures, and their presentation to the patients, give an honest and
fair portrayal of relevant information or if, instead, the disclosures are
likely to manipulate, mislead, or confuse women in the informed
consent process and/or create a warped vision of the procedure.
The latter would dangerously threaten a woman’s autonomous decision-making in the most direct way by inserting misleading considerations into her thought process. In this way, informed consent disclo258
259

Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1198 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
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sures are more dangerous to the core of Roe than logistical barriers.
But the nonmisleading standard can act as a dyke against such dangers.
At the same time, the nonmisleading standard can also serve other
constitutional functions as well. The nonmisleading requirement can
act as a proxy for the purpose prong of Casey, which requires that
state regulation have the purpose of informing, not hindering, a
260
woman’s choice.
State regulation must not have the purpose of
creating a substantial obstacle for a woman seeking an abortion.
However, purpose evaluations are notoriously difficult to make. For
example, the discriminatory purpose test for race or sex discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, where the statute itself is
race or sex “neutral,” has raised prohibitive barriers to challenging
261
acts with discriminatory effects. Unless a statute inscribes its unconstitutional purpose into the text, the Court is hesitant to ascribe unconstitutional purposes to the state where constitutional purposes
might explain the statute instead.
Scholars have noted that it has been particularly difficult to prove
262
an unconstitutional purpose in the Casey context.
In Mazurek v.
Armstrong, the Supreme Court suggested that it is possible that an impermissible purpose can never be found without an impermissible ef263
fect. However, it did not directly so hold.
Nonetheless, lower
courts have often ignored the purpose prong entirely or, when they
have addressed it, “define[d] the test negatively, describing the type
of evidence that is insufficient to establish improper purpose but
never indicating what evidence, short of a defendant’s outright ad264
Only a few cases have ever
mission on the record, might suffice.”
265
found an unconstitutional purpose under Casey.
A robust application of the nonmisleading standard can help to
mollify the effects of a weak purpose prong and identify statutes with
260
261
262
263
264
265

Id. at 877.
See generally Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136 (1997).
See, e.g., Wharton, Frietsche & Kolbert, supra note 7, at 378.
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
Wharton, Frietsche & Kolbert, supra note 7, at 378.
E.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the state requirement that a director obtain a certificate of need in order to
build an abortion clinic was unconstitutional); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th
Cir. 1996) (holding that a state provision that only allowed abortions after twenty weeks
with only narrow exceptions was unconstitutional); Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977
(E.D. La. 1998),aff’d, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 244 F.3d 405 (5th
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that a state statute that rendered the doctor providing an
abortion liable in tort for any derivative injury to the mother was unconstitutional).
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unconstitutional purposes as well as effects. In further explaining the
purpose prong, the Court in Casey explained that “[a] statute with
this purpose [of placing a substantial obstacle] is invalid because the
means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must
266
be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”
Where the regulations run afoul of a robust nonmisleading inquiry,
meaning that the information is calculated to manipulate or confuse
a woman’s decision-making process, then the statute does not meet
the requirement that it be calculated to inform, not hinder, a woman’s decision.
Finally, as discussed above, the women-protective antiabortion argument, which underlies many second-generation dissuasion regulations, is premised on impermissible assumptions about women’s role
in society and their capacity to make independent decisions. Based
on these impermissible assumptions, antiabortion advocates support
regulations that insist that abortion harms women, both physically
and psychologically, despite the lack of medical evidence supporting
these claims. Further, these impermissible assumptions support an
argument that any and all restrictions on abortion, regardless of the
veracity of their claims or the legitimacy of their medical motives, are
acceptable because they “protect” women from their own choices to
seek abortions.
The nonmisleading inquiry will invalidate regulations based on such
impermissible assumptions about women. Again, the nonmisleading
inquiry will only allow disclosures that present a fair and accurate impression of the abortion procedure as well as a woman’s alternative
options. Therefore, regulations that (1) require disclosures regarding harms to women from abortion that are not medically supported
or (2) seek to restrict abortion in any manner possible on the theory
that “abortion always harms women” will be rejected. These regulations can be exposed as impermissibly supported by gender stereotypes since their content is misleading. The content of such disclosures clearly seeks to hinder, not inform, women’s decisions on the
basis that (1) women lack the capacity to make these choices and (2)
the natural role for every woman is mother. Therefore, in addition to
promoting the autonomy of women’s decisions and identifying statutes with the unconstitutional purpose of creating a substantial obstacle to abortion access, the nonmisleading inquiry can identify statutes supported by impermissible assumptions about women. The
following Subpart applies the nonmisleading standard to three of the
266

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added).
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dissuasion laws discussed above to illustrate how it can aid courts in
applying the autonomy–protecting principle within the undue burden standard and the limits of the standard as an analytic tool.
2. The Nonmisleading Standard As Applied
a. The “Whole, Separate, Unique, Living Human Being” Disclosure
As outlined in subpart II.B.6, several states now require doctors to
tell women that abortion ends the life of a “whole, separate, unique,
living human being.” The Eighth Circuit—relying on the technical
statutory definition of “human being” and depositions from scientists
stating that accepting such a definition would be scientifically accu267
rate—upheld the requirement against a Casey challenge.
This dissuasion law most clearly demonstrates how the application of the
nonmisleading standard, in line with its application in Akron and the
autonomy principle in Casey, would drastically change the legal analysis. The Eighth Circuit relied on evidence in the record to conclude
that at least one reading of the language of the disclosure, although
divergent from common parlance, was not inaccurate and, on that
268
basis, upheld the disclosure. Under a proper nonmisleading analysis, the court’s task is not to determine whether there is an available,
technically accurate interpretation of the disclosure. Rather, the
court must place itself in the position of the reasonable woman and
determine whether her likely understanding of the disclosure is one
that would accurately inform her decision or mislead or manipulate
her decision-making process.
From this perspective, the “whole, separate, unique, living human
being” disclosure almost certainly fails. The reasonable woman will
certainly interpret the disclosure as an assertion of the moral status of
the fetus as a human being: that the fetus is a human being not in
the biological sense of being a member of the species Homo sapiens
but in a “second and distinct sense” that it is a “member of the community of human persons whose life possesses dignity and warrants
269
respect.”
As Robert Post argues, “It hardly seems plausible that a
woman could be confused about whether she is carrying the biologi270
cal fetus of a zebra, a raccoon, or a bat.”
267
268
269
270

Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724,
738 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 735–36.
Post, supra note 225, at 954–55.
Id. at 954.
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Understood as portraying this message, it is clear that the state is
using its power to regulate the doctor-patient relationship to convey
as fact an answer to the unsettled moral question that underlies the
entire abortion conflict. It is precisely because the Court held in Roe,
and again in Casey, that the state cannot dictate how a woman answers
the question of whether the fetus constitutes human life that the
woman has the right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.
If the woman truly accepted this statement as fact, in all but perhaps
the rarest circumstances, her decision would be entirely shortcircuited. Referring back to Akron confirms that this disclosure would
fail a more robust nonmisleading test. In Akron, the law required
doctors to tell women “the unborn child is a human life from the
271
moment of conception.” The Court rejected the disclosure as “inconsistent with the Court’s holding in Roe v. Wade that a State may
not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of
272
abortions.” The state could not lead a woman to believe that an unsettled question constitutionally left to the individual woman was indeed settled. Indeed, even the Eighth Circuit recognized that to the
extent that the statement was read to make a “point in the debate
about the ethics of abortion,” it would be improper under the truth273
ful and nonmisleading standard. Therefore, under a more comprehensive understanding of the nonmisleading standard, the
“whole, separate, unique, living human being disclosure” would fail.
b. The 2011 South Dakota Dissuasion Law: Risk Disclosures and
Crisis Pregnancy Center Counseling
The 2011 South Dakota dissuasion law included many components. This Subpart applies the nonmisleading standard to its risk
disclosure and crisis pregnancy center sections to demonstrate the
more complex ways that the standard can change the manner in
which courts analyze these laws. Subpart II.B.2. outlined South Dakota’s new risk disclosure law, which would require doctors to screen for
every “risk factor,” defined broadly, ever reported to be associated
with abortion ever published in an English peer-reviewed study anywhere since 1972, and disclose any “complications” associated with
274
those risk factors. Even under the weaker standard courts are cur271
272
273
274

City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 423 n.5 (1983).
Id. at 444.
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724,
735 (8th Cir. 2008).
H.B. 1217, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011).
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rently enforcing, the district court held that the statute did not provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that the risks required to be disclosed under the law would not be false or patently misleading. For
example, the law could require disclosure of an abortion-breast can275
cer link, which has been firmly rejected by the medical literature.
However, as discussed above, one could imagine a version of the
South Dakota law that ensured that the law only covered medically
accurate studies, but would still require such an abundance of information that it would likely severely disrupt the informed consent process and the woman’s ability to make an intelligent assessment of her
276
options.
The nonmisleading analysis provides a vehicle for the
courts to determine whether the dissuasion law disrupts autonomy in
this manner, regardless of the technical truthfulness of the disclosures. Again, the question for the courts is whether the risk disclosures, from the perspective of the patient, will provide an accurate
portrayal of relevant information or disrupt her ability to make a
competent decision. Like the disclosure in Akron, the South Dakota
law would force women to listen to a “parade of horribles” that would
incorrectly “suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous proce277
dure.”
Furthermore, the nonmisleading standard would allow the
courts to take cognizance of the psychological studies and informed
consent literature that suggests that the disclosure required by this
law would create the type of cognitive overload that would disrupt a
patient’s ability to make an informed choice.
The 2011 South Dakota law also required women to visit crisis
pregnancy centers for independent counseling before accessing an
abortion. The court struck this provision down on the separate First
278
Amendment ground of a woman’s right against compelled speech.
The nonmisleading standard provides another way of evaluating this
provision. Under current case law, the courts would not necessarily
analyze the content of the possible misleading effects of the provision
since the counseling is provided by a third party, not the state, and
the state does not dictate the disclosures the pregnancy center must
give. However, under the nonmisleading standard, the question is
not just whether the state dictates factually inaccurate disclosures.
Rather, the inquiry is whether the state forces the woman into a position where her decision-making will be disrupted by disclosures that
275
276
277
278

Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp.
2d 1048, 1071–72 (D.S.D. 2011).
See supra Subpart II.B.2.
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983).
Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1054–55, 1077.
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create false impressions about her options. Seen in this light, the
state should not be permitted under the nonmisleading standard to
delegate the mandatory disclosure process to a third party unless it
dictates the content of the disclosures. This is not to suggest that the
state must dictate the disclosures given by a woman’s doctor, since
she freely chooses which doctor to approach. But when the state requires a woman to enter a counseling session in order to access abortion, it must ensure that the content of that discussion is nonmisleading. In other words, the nonmisleading standard will not allow the
state to do by proxy what it cannot do directly.
c. The Mandatory Ultrasound with Mandatory Descriptions
Analysis of the mandatory ultrasound laws, in particular those that
require not only that all women have an ultrasound, but also that every woman’s provider show her the image and describe it to her re279
gardless of her wishes, demonstrates the limitation of the nonmisleading standard as a tool for analyzing abortion regulation under
the broader undue burden framework. The mandatory ultrasound
does not appear to carry the danger most prominent in Akron and
that the nonmisleading standard was developed to counter: the use
of the informed consent dialogue to create false impressions of abortion and its alternatives and the manipulation of a woman’s ability to
make a competent and knowing decision. The ultrasound image
does not introduce misleading information into the informed consent dialogue in the conventional sense. One could argue that mandatory ultrasounds seek to emotionally manipulate the decisionmaking process and in that sense violate the nonmisleading standard.
Ultrasound requirements seek to force women to confront an unwanted image, powerfully symbolic of motherhood, in the hopes that
the emotional impact will compel her to continue her pregnancy. As
Carol Sanger writes, it “is meant to bend a woman’s will once she has
280
already made up her mind to seek an abortion.”
However, because the ultrasound image and the doctor’s script do
not contain the types of confusing or misleading information paradigmatic of the standard as elaborated in Akron, the nonmisleading
standard does not seem like the most appropriate tool for analyzing
these provisions. Thus, the mandatory ultrasound law illustrates the
limitations of the nonmisleading standard. The standard is only one
279
280

See supra Subpart II.B.5.
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tool for implementing the broader undue burden framework that Casey implemented to place autonomy–protecting constraints on the
State’s right to regulate abortion throughout pregnancy. Ultrasound
requirements may be more appropriately analyzed directly under the
undue burden framework; courts must determine whether the laws
have the “purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
281
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”
As
Sanger argues, the distinctiveness of the ultrasound requirement and
its use of a woman’s own body to produce a powerfully symbolic image of motherhood for the woman to confront may pose such a sub282
stantial obstacle.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze
how the undue burden framework applies to mandatory ultrasound
requirements. However, the application of the nonmisleading standard to these regulations demonstrates the limits of the standard in
protecting women’s autonomy and reminds us that the standard is
only part and parcel of the larger undue burden framework erected
in Casey.
CONCLUSION
Casey sought to strike a balance through the undue burden
framework between the state’s interest in regulating to protect potential life and the woman’s liberty interest in autonomously deciding
whether to continue her pregnancy. The truthful and nonmisleading
standard was one of the autonomy-protecting constraints that Casey
placed on the states as it opened up the space for the state to regulate
abortion. A close reading of Akron, Thornburgh, and Casey together
demonstrates that the nonmisleading standard, at least in part, has its
roots in the Akron decision. Doctor-patient dialogue regulation has
come full circle since the Akron decision. The Court in Akron struck
down the challenged statute because it sought to convince women to
continue their pregnancy through misleading disclosures. The regulations in Thornburgh and Casey sought to persuade women but
through nonmisleading means. However, the new generation of doctor-patient regulations, which this Article has termed dissuasion laws,
more closely resembles the misleading disclosures of the statute in
Akron than the disclosures approved in Casey. Recent case law
demonstrates that lower courts are seeking to respond to this increasingly aggressive generation of regulations to enforce the balance of

281
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
Sanger, supra note 280, at 361.
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interests recognized in Casey but lack the analytical tools for determining what is misleading under Casey. A close reading of Akron can
provide the starting point for a more robust nonmisleading standard
that will faithfully implement the principles of Casey.

